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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Contracts-Offer and Counter-Offer Under the Uniform Commercial
Code
In Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett & Co.,' plaintiff, a corpora-
tion doing business in New York, mailed a written order to de-
fendant requesting emulsion for use as cellophane adhesive in "wet-
pack spinach bags." Upon receiving plaintiff's order, defendant, a
Massachusetts manufacturer, mailed an acknowledgment on which
was printed in conspicuous type, "All goods sold without warranties,
express or implied.... ." The goods were shipped the following day.
When vegetable bags produced with this emulsion failed to adhere,
plaintiff brought suit for breach of implied warranty. Defendant
contended that the contract expressly negated any warranties. The
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts di-
rected a verdict for the defendant, and the First Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed holding section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial
Code,2 as adopted by Massachusetts,3 controlling.
The common-law rules for the formation of an informal contract
require that all parties manifest assent to its terms.4 An offer is a
sufficient manifestation only when its terms are such that the promises
and performances to be rendered by the parties are reasonably cer-
'297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962).2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE & NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMIS-
SIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE [herein-
after cited as U.C.C.].
* MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-207 (1958) provides: "(1) A defi-
nite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which
is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it
states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon,
unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional
or different terms. (2) The additional terms are to be construed as pro-
posals for addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become
part of the contract unless: (a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the
terms of the offer; (b) they materially alter it; or (c) notification of objec-
tion is given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received. (3)
Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is suf-
ficient to establish a contract for sale even though the writings of the parties
do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular
contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree,
together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provi-
sions of this Act."
'E.g., Dodds v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 205 N.C. 153, 170 S.E. 652
(1933). See generally RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 20 (1932); 1 WILLIS-
TON, CONTRACTS § 18 (3rd ed. 1957).
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tain.5 An acceptance is sufficient only if it complies exactly with
the requirements of the offer ;6 otherwise it is a counter-offer.'
The drafters of 'the Uniform Commercial Code sought to revise
the law of commercial sales transactions to conform with accepted
commercial practices.' Accordingly, there are no comparable re-
quirements of certainty in the provisions of the Code dealing directly
with the formation of a contract for the sale of goods.' Such a con-
tract "may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement
including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of
such a: contract,"'1 and agreement may be shown by establishing the
existence of a bargain between parties from their language or "by
implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or
usage of trade or course of performance."'" Once the existence of
an agreement is established, the problem is to determine the legal
obligation which results. 2
Section 2-207 is one of the sections which aids in determining the
extent of this "legal obligation." Subsection one provides that the
formation of a contract is not prevented by the inclusion of additional
terms in a definite expression of acceptance or a written confirmation,
unless acceptance is- made expressly conditional on inclusion of the
additional or different terms. Subsection two provides that these
additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract and will not become a part thereof if their inclusion would
materially alter the obligations of the parties.
'E.g., Yeager v. Dobbins, 252 N.C. 824, 114 S.E.2d 820 (1960). See
generally RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 32 (1932) ; 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 22
(1950) ;" 1 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 4, § 24.
E~g., Standard Sand & Gravel Co. v. McClay, 191 N.C. 313, 131 S.E.
754 (1926): See generally RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 59 (1932) ; 1 COR-
BIN, op. cit. supra note 5, § 82; 1 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 4, § 77.
'E.g., Northeastern Constr. Co. v. City of Winston-Salem, 83 F.2d 57
(4th Cir. 1936). See generally RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 38, 60 (1932).
"[T]he draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial Code... took the sensible
position that no simple contract rule should control a sales contract unless it
could be demonstrated that such a rule would be useful and efficacious in the
commercial world of sales." HAwKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES 1 (2d
ed. 1958). See also Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales; Should
It Be E nacted?, 59 YALE L.J. 821 (1950) (approving the validity of the
drafters' premise); Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform
Commercial Code, 63 HAv. L. REv. 561 (1950) (criticizing the validity of
the premise).
The provisions of the Code dealing directly with the formation of a
contract for the sale of goods are sections 2-201 to 2-210.1
°U.C.C. §2-204(1)- -1 U.C.C. § 1-201 (3).12U.C.C. § 1-201(11).
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In the principal case, -plaintiff sought to invoke this section by
urging that defendant accepted the terms of the order and thereby
completed the agreement when it mailed the acknowledgment; that
the attempted disclaimer of warranties was a proposal for addition
to the contract materially altering the terms; and that this proposed
addition never became part of the contract because express assent to
its inclusion had never been given. The court found section 2-207
applicable but construed it to mean that "a response which states a
condition materially altering the obligation solely to the disadvantage
of the offeror is an 'acceptance . .. expressly . . . conditional on
assent to the additional ... terms.' "'s Thus, if the additional terms
in the response would materially alter the obligations of the parties
there is no contract. The court pointed out that if the offeree's reply
sets out conditions burdensome only to the offeror, and that if such
a reply consummates a contract, there is no reason for the offeror to
agree to the additional terms. , It further concluded that if there is,
no reason for the offeror to accept such terms, there is no reason for
the offeree to propose them and in the event he. does, it must be
because he does not intend to make a contract on the original terms
proposed.
The court, therefore, limits section 2407 to conform with re-
sults' 4 commonly reached under common-law rules that an acceptance
may include requests for addition to the contract, 5 and tliat silence'
may be a manifestation of assent if previous dealings or other cir-
cumstances are such that it would reasonably be interpreted as having
that meaning.' 6 An analysis of two earlier New York cases 7 illus-
297 F.2d at 500.
1, See a collection of these results in 34 N.C.L. REV. 225 '(1956).
Carver v. Britt, 241 N.C. 538, 85 S.E.2d 888 (1955). See generally
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 62 (1932).
" Vaughan's Seed Store, Inc. v. Morris April & Bros., 123 N.J.L. 26, 7
A.2d 868 (1939). See generally RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §72(1)(c)(1932). The court agreed that section 2-207 changed the common law, but
only to the limited extent of modifying "the strict principle that a response
not precisely in accordance with the offer was a rejection and a counter-
offer." 297 F.2d at 500.7 Nordic Trading Co. v. Imperial Forwarding Co., 197 Misc. 27, 96
N.Y.S.2d 745 (Spec. Term, N.Y.C., 1949) aff'd memn., 197 Misc. 1042, 98
N.Y.S.2d 412 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 216
N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619 (1915). See also Catz Am. Sales Corp. v. Hol-'
leb & Co., 272 App. Div. 689, 74 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1947), aff'd 298 N.Y. 504.
80 N.E.2d 656 (1948). However, the problems in these cases are not ex-
clusive to New York. See Gettier-Montanye, Inc. v. Davidson Granite Co.,
75 Ga. App. 377, 43 S.E.2d 716 (1947) ; Schneider Constr. Co. v. Fraser Brick
& Tile Co., 297 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1957); W. S. Hoge & Bro. v. Prince
William Co-op. Exch., 141 Va. 676, 126 SE. 687 (1925).-
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trates that though the common-law rules may prevent the enforce-
ment of unintended contracts, they may also defeat the legal effective-
ness of certain commercial bargains by which the parties have in-
tended to impose binding obligations.
In Nordic Trading Co. v. Imperial Forwarding Co.' s defendant
sent a letter to plaintiff offering to purchase goods. Plaintiff con-
firmed on an order blank that contained the following printed pro-
visions: "All orders are booked subject to availability of goods" and
"We reserve the right to make part shipments against this order."
Defendant objected to these printed clauses and refused to receive
the goods even after assurance from plaintiff that the printed clauses
were never intended to become part of the contract. In granting
defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings in an action for
breach of contract, the court held that the writings of the parties
had never manifested assent to the same terms. The fact that plain-
tiff did not intend the printed clauses to be incorporated in the con-
tract made no difference because if the situation had been reversed,
and if defendant had sued plaintiff, the latter could have relied on
either clause as a defense.19 Moreover, the Statute of Frauds pre-
vented the enforcement of any agreement contrary to the terms of the
order blank that might have been shown by the admission of oral
testimony.
In Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co.2 0 defendant's agent
made an oral offer to plaintiff, and plaintiff accepted in writing.
Two days later, the agent sent one of defendant's standard order
forms to plaintiff with the exact terms of the plaintiff's acceptance
written on its face; however, one of the printed provisions of the
standard order form required that acceptance of the order be acknowl-
edged. Plaintiff did not acknowledge, and shortly before shipments
were to begin, plaintiff received a letter from defendant cancelling
the agreement. In an action for breach of contract, the court held
that the order form was a counter-offer because it contained an
1 Supra, note 17.
" Whatever ambiguity existed did not concern the meaning of the clauses,
but rather the intent of the parties. In interpreting contracts courts give
language its natural and appropriate meaning and will not admit evidence of
what the parties may have thought the meaning to be. See Pacific Portland
Cement Co. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 178 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1949);
Richardson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 171 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1948) ; Campbell v.
Rockefeller, 134 Conn. 585, 59 A.2d 524 (1948) ; Joliet Bottling Co. v. Joliet
Citizens' Brewing Co., 254 Ill. 215, 98 N.E. 263 (1912).go 216 N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619 (1915).
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additional term requiring acknowledgment and that it was not for
the court to say that such an addition was not material to the de-
fendant. The court further said that plaintiff could not rely on
defendant's cancellation letter as a memorandum of an oral agreement
because such a contract would not have come into existence until
plaintiff acknowledged, which it failed to do.
The decision in both cases required an interpretation of printed
clauses which were probably not considered part of the bargain by
either party at the time of attempted consummation of the contract.
Moreover, neither court was concerned with enforcing the true in-
tent of the parties. They purported to give effect to the manifesta-
tions of the parties while at the same time excluding evidence that
might have shown the terms to which the parties actually assented.
Such interpretations are based on the reasoning that when parties
have reduced their intentions to writing, those intentions are going
to be most accurately reflected by the writing itself.21 Although this
reasoning may be valid in most situations,22 it is questionable whether
it is applicable to the accepted commercial practice of using forms.
These forms are drafted to protect the parties in any situation which
might arise and do not necessarily reflect the intentions of the parties
in any particular transaction. In such a situation agreements reached
either orally or by informal correspondence are apt to reflect the
intentions of the parties more accurately than forms containing
standard printed clauses.
The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code intended the pro-
visions of section 2-207 to determine the effect of these printed
clauses.23 If they involve no element of unreasoiable surprise and
if notice of objection to their inclusion is not seasonably given, the
clauses will be incorporated in the contract. 4 Conversely, if their
incorporation would result in surprise or hardship to the other party,
they will not be incorporated unless expressly agreed to.25  A party
using forms may protect himself by providing in the form that the
expression of acceptance is not effective unless the additional or dif-
ferent terms are assented to.2 6
21E.g., Neal v. Marrone, 239 N.C. 73, 79 S.E.2d 239 (1953).
" Under the Code consistent additional terms may not be proven if the
court finds that the writing was intended as a complete and exclusive state-
ment of all the terms. U.C.C. § 2-202, comment 3.
23 See U.C.C. § 2-207, comment 1.
" See U.C.C. § 2-207, comment 5.
"See U.C.C. § 2-207, comment 4.
"o See U.C.C. § 2-207, comment 2.
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The court in the principal case found the printed clauses in the
acknowledgment to be the controlling expression of defendant's in-
tent. By doing so, however, it ignores comment two of section 2-207
which prohibits such a finding when there is an agreement in exist-
ence between the parties at the time the acknowledgment is dis-
patched, unless the acknowledgment states that its expression of
acceptance will not be effective until assent is given to the additional
or different terms.17
At the end of 1960, the Uniform Commercial Code had been
adopted in only six states ;28 since then, it has been enacted in twelve
more.29 Consequently, litigation concerning the interpretation of
the Code is bound to increase. However, until considerable litigation
has ensued, the only mutually applicable authority courts will have
in interpreting it will be the comments which the drafters have ap-
pended to the various sections. Unless courts explain their decisions
in terms of these comments, the uniformity of the law of commercial
transactions which the Code contemplates80 will not be realized.
WILLIAM EMMETT UNDERWOOD, JR.
Criminal Law-Procedure--Indictments--Principal Includes Acces-
sory Before the Fact as Lesser Offense
The common law defines a principal in crime as a person who
actually participates in the commission of a felony.' A principal in
the first degree commits the crime either by his own hand or by the
hand of his agent, and such principal must be actually or construc-
tively present at the act. A principal in the second degree is present,
actually or constructively, and aids or abets in the commission of
The result reached by the court may have been contemplated by com-
ment 2, but this is impossible to determine since the court did not consider
the possibility that the relationship of the parties and their prior dealings indi-
cated that an agreement may have been reached at the time the acknowledg-
ment was dispatched.
28 Connecticut, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania
and Rhode Island.
" Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon and Wyoming.
"0 Section 1-102(2) provides: "Underlying purposes and policies of this
Act are (a), to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions; (b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices
through custom, usage and agreement of the parties; (c) to make uniform the
law among the various jurisdictions."
1 There are no accessories to treason and misdemeanors at common law.
I WHARTON, CmImIxAL LAW AND PRocEDuRE § 102 (1957).
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the crime but does not himself perpetrate it. An accessory before
the fact procures, counsels or commands another to commit a felony
but is not present, actually or constructively, at its commission.2
A sharp split of opinion concerning the law of principals and
accessories divided the North Carolina Supreme Court in a recent
decision, and this division reflects a general split of authority among
other jurisdictions. In State v. Jones,' the court, by a four to three
majority, held that accessory before the fact is a lesser included
offense in an indictment for murder. It seems worthwhile to
examine the background of this decision and to ponder its rami-
fications.
The applicable North Carolina statutes,5 augmenting the common
law, provide that an accessory before the fact may be indicted and
convicted of a "substantive felony" -whether the principal shall or
shall not have been previously convicted, and that the punishment
for accessory before the fact of murder, arson, burglary, and rape
shall be life imprisonment.
The North Carolina court laid -the groundwork for the Jones
opinion in its decision in State v. Bryson,6 where it interpreted the
statutes as implying that the common-law distinction between princi-
pal and accessory was abolished. This would indicate that the
accused could be found guilty as a principal regardless of proof that
he was not present at the criminal act. Indeed, the court in the
Bryson case approved of this situation.7
Id. at §§ 102-10. See State v. Bass, 255 N.C. 42, 120 S.E.2d 580 (1961).
8254 N.C. 450, 119 S.E.2d 213 (1961). For a brief discussion of this
case, see Criminal Law, Ninth Annual Case Law Survey, 40 N.C.L. REv. 517(1962).
' "Upon the trial of any indictment the prisoner may be convicted of the
crime charged therein or of -a less degree of the same crime, or of an attempt
to commit the crime so charged, or of an attempt to commit a less degree of
the same crime." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-170 (1953).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-5, -6 (1953).
173 N.C. 803, 92 S.E. 698 (1917). -
"Upholding the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that the accused
could not be convicted as a principal if he was not present at the murder,
the court said that it was "of opinion that the indictment and conviction of
the prisoner in this case comes within the language and intent of Revisal,
3287, and 3269 [N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-5, 15-170 (1953)], which made acces-
sory before the fact the 'substantive felony,' and which are intended to destroy
the technical distinctions which had so often led to such miscarriages ofjustice as would be caused here if the prisoner, who has been tried and
convicted upon evidence of his active participation in causing the death of
his wife by counseling, aiding and procuring his daughter to slay her, should
be discharged of all liability." State v. Bryson, id. at 806, 92 S.E. at 699.
The Bryson court, faced with a problem of statutory interpretation, ap-
1962]
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But apparently this is the only occasion when the court has ex-
pressly discounted the element of presence." Even the principal case,'
although relying on Bryson in holding that accessory is a lesser
included offense, recognized that presence distinguishes a principal
from an accessory. The accused in the Jones case was indicted and
tried for murder. The court stated that since the crime of accessory
before the fact was included in the indictment as a lesser offense, the
trial judge should have instructed the jury as to the elements of
accessory if evidence was offered tending to show that the accused
procured, counseled or commanded the murder, but was not present
at its commission. It would seem that if the distinction is abolished,
no such instruction would be necessary inasmuch as the jury could
convict as principal regardless of presence or absence.' 0
Two cases" decided prior to the Bryson case held that the dis-
tinction between accessory and principal was not abolished and, con-
sequently, that accessory before the fact was not a lesser included
offense. It should be pointed out that the Bryson court, although
aware of the earlier decisions, was faced with a fact situation where-
by the accused stood to receive a lighter sentence for second degree
murder than he could have received as an accessory before the fact
of first degree murder. The court reasoned that since the sentence
imposed (20 years imprisonment) was less than that to which he
parently concluded that "substantive felony" meant the offense of the prin-
cipal. Contra, the Maine court's interpretation of a similar statute: "[T]he
offense for which an accessory before the fact may be indicted and convicted
is a substantive felony, a form of expression, which is general, and not meant
to refer to either [principal or accessory] . . . . A substantive felony is
that which depends upon itself, and is not dependent upon another felony,
which is established by the conviction of the one, who committed it, alone."
State v. Ricker, 29 Me. 84 (1848).8But see State v. Bryson, supra note 7, at 806, 92 S.E. at 699, which
cited State v. Chastain, 104 N.C. 900, 10 S.E. 519 (1889) as holding that
the element of presence is not a prerequisite for a conviction as a principal.
In the latter case the accused, armed with a rifle and concealed 150 yards
behind his brother, who was lying in wait for the victim, was indicted and
convicted as a principal. It seems, however, that the accused was construc-
tively present and indictable, consequently, as a principal in the second degree.
"A person is constructively present, and therefore guilty as a principal, if
he is acting with the person who actually commits the deed in pursuance of
a common design, and is aiding his associate, either by keeping watch or
otherwise, or is so situated as to be able to aid him, with a view, known to
the other, to insure success in the accomplishment of the common enterprise."
CLARK AND MARSHALL, LAW OF CRImEs § 167 (5th ed. 1952).
State v. Jones, 254 N.C. 450, 119 S.E.2d 213 (1961).
10 Cf., jury instruction in State v. Bryson, 173 N.C. 803, 92 S.E. 698
(1917).
" State v. Green, 119 N.C. 899, 26 S.E. 112 (1896); State v. Dewer, 65
N.C. 572 (1871).
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was liable if he had been tried and convicted as an accessory before
the fact (life imprisonment), the accused could not complain that
he was not convicted as an accessory. In reaching this result the
court apparently left the door open for future misunderstandings.
While the strict, narrow holding of the Bryson case was that the
accused could be convicted of second degree murder under an indict-
ment for murder, whether or not he was present at the crime, the
court three years later interpreted this to mean that accessory before
the fact is a lesser included offense in an indictment for the princi-
pal's crime.' 2
This problem has arisen in North Carolina and elsewhere as a
result of the enactment of statutes that have altered the common-law
concepts of accessory and principal. Some jurisdictions have adopted
statutes 3 which provide that the distinction between accessory before
the fact and principal is abolished, while others have enacted statutes 4
which do not expressly abolish the distinction but at the same time
provide the same punishment for both offenders. The North Caro-
lina statutes would appear to occupy a third category.' We have
seen that under their provisions the punishments for a principal and
for an accessory before the fact are not necessarily identical. The
matter of the abolition of the distinction in North Carolina is less
clear.
Other jurisdictions have held'" that statutes providing for the
prosecution of accessories before the fact jointly with the principal,
and for their trial regardless of whether or not the principal is tried,
do not abolish the common-law distinction between accessory and
principal. It has also been held' that the distinction is not abolished
by statutes making one who aids, abets or procures another to com-
mit a felony, guilty of a substantive crime. Despite a statute pro-
viding that their punishments are identical, it has been held'" that
" State v. Simons, 179 N.C. 700, 103 S.E. 5 (1920) (dictum).
"See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1950); CAL. PENAL CODE § 31 (1955); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 776.011 (Supp. 1961); N.Y. PENAL CODE § 2 (Supp. 1962);
WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.01.030 (1961).
1' See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-196 (1958); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-
602, -603 (1953); MASs. LAWS ANN. ch. 274, § 2 (1956); S.C. CODE § 16-1
(1952); W. VA. CODE § 6118 (1955).
" But see State v. Bryson, 173 N.C. 803, 806, 92 S.E. 698, 699 (1917),
where the court seemed to consider North Carolina's statutes as among those
abolishing the distinction.
"' Able v. Commonwealth, 68 Ky. 698 (1869); State v. Ricker, 29 Me.
84 (1848); State v. Roberts, 50 W. Va. 422, 40 S.E. 484 (1901).
'v State v. Ricker, supra note 16.Able v. Commonwealth, 68 Ky. 698 (1869); State v. Ricker, 29 Me. 84
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thedistinction between principal and accessory prevails. Conversely,
it has been held 9 that a statute providing that accessories shall be
punished in the same manner as the principal in effect makes princi-
pals of accessories before the fact.
The primary problem born of this controversy is that of the
proper manner of drawing the indictment. The common-law rule
is that an accessory before the fact in a felony case must be indicted
as such and not as a principal.2" But by virtue of statutes2' in some
jurisdictions it has been held22 that an accessory before the fact may
be indicted as though he were the principal without setting out the
facts by which he advised, counseled, or procured another to commit
the crime. In some instances the statutes23 expressly provide that
an accessory before the fact may or shall be indicted as a principal.
But even in the absence of such a provision, where the distinctions
between principals and accessories before the fact have been abolished,
the indictment has been held24 to have been properly drawn against
a principal. By following the opinions in State v. Simo= 25 and
State v. Jones, 26 it is now permissible in North Carolina to draw an
indictment against the accused as a principal and convict him there-
under as an accessory before the fact.
(1848); State v. Lacoshus, 96 N.H. 76, 70 A.2d 203 (1950); State v. Pa-
triarca, 71, R.I. 151, 43 A.2d 54 (1945); State v. Jennings, 158 S.C. 422,
155 S.E. 621 (1930); Pierce v. State, 130 Tenn. 24, 168 S.W. 851 (1914).
State v. Patriarca, supra, raises an interesting point concerning limitation
of actions. It holds that where a felony and being an accessory before
the fact to a felony are regarded as distinct offenses, a statute except-
ing murder from a limitation of the time for instituting criminal prosecution
cannot be regarded as also excepting a prosecution on the charge of being an
accessory before the fact to the crime of murder, even though the statute
provides that the accessory shall suffer the same punishment as the principal.
People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 229, 21 Am. Dec. 122 (N.Y. 1830) is sometimes
cited as opposing the Rhode Island case, but its opinion on this point is
dictum.
Buie v. State, 68 Fla. 320, 67 So. 102 (1914). Subsequent to this de-
cision the Florida statute was rewritten, abolishing the distinction. See note
13 supra.
2042 C.J.S. Indictments and Inzformzations § 148 (1944).
"='E.g., COLO. Rv. STAT. § 40-1-12 (1953); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §28.979(1954); WAs. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.01.030 (1961).
22 Newton v. People, 96 Colo. 246, 41 P.2d 300 (1935); People v. Knoll,
258 Mich. 89, 242 N.W. 222 (1932) ; State v., Cooper, 26 Wash. 2d 405, 174
P.2d 545 (1946).2 E.g., IOWA CODE § 688.1 (1950); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.979 (1954);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4 (1958) ; VA. CODE § 18.1-11 (1950) ; WAsu. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.01.030 (1961).People v. Bliven, 112 N.Y. 79, 19 N.E. 638 (1889).
22179 N.C. 700, 103 S.E. 5 (1920).
28254 N.C. 450, 119 S.E.2d 213 (1961).
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A question still to be adjudicated, in the-light of the North Caro-
lina cases herein discussed, is the interesting one 'of former jeopardy.
It was the common-law rules that prosecution as a principal did not
forbid a subsequent prosecution as.an accessory. Where.it is con-
sidered that principal and accessory are distinct offenses and not
different degrees of the same crime, the general rule is that an
acquittal of one indicted as a principal is not a bar to a subsequent
indictment against him as an accessory; and, conversely, an acquittal
as an accessory is no bar to an indictment as a principal. On the
other hand, jeopardy does. attach when accessories may be indicted
as principals.17  However, the North Carolina court has indicated
that it is at least sympathetic with the idea that jeopardy should
attach, under the proper circumstances, when the offenses are sepa-
rate and distinct. 8
Where the courts do rule that jeopardy attaches upon the indict-
ment of an accessory as a principal, it seems that, speaking 'for the
accused, this rule is one salutary result of such changes'in the con-
mon law as have 'been disdussed in this note. Balancing this result
is the possibility that the accused -could be unduly burdened in' pre-
paring his defense in those jurisdictions, including North Carolina,
where he may be convicted as an accessory before the fact under arf
indictment as a principal.
A reconsideration of the holding of the Bryson case, when 'the
opportunity next presents itself, may be in order. 9 If the Jones case
can be interpreted as maintaining the distinction between Principal
and accessory before the fact for purposes of the trial court's instruc-
2' 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 294 (1961); Contra, People v. Mather, -4
Wend. 229, 21 Am. Dec. 122 (NhY. 1830) (dictum).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-5 (1953) 'provides that "no person who shall be
once duly tried for any-such, offense, whether as an accessory before the,fact
or as for a substantive felony, shall be liableto be again indicted or tried
for the same offense." The Bryson court expressed the opinion that'the
proviso "gives force to the prisoner's motion for an absolute discharge and
exemption from liability if it was error to try him for the substantive felony
of murder in counseling, procuring, or commanding his daughter to slay her
mother . . . ." State v. Bryson, 173 N.C. 803, 805-06, 92 S.E, 698,/699
(1917). But because the court found no error in the trial, the question was
not adjudicated.
9 The holding of the Bryson case was not disputed in the argument of-the
principal case before the court. Note also that in its appellate brief the state
submitted that a charge of conspiracy would provide another means of arriv-
ing at a verdict of murder in the first degree. "Everyone who enters into a
common purpose or design is equally deemed in law a party to every act whicl
may afterwards be done by any one of the others, in furtherance of such
common design." State v. Jackson, 82 N.C. 565 (1880), quoted in Brief for
the State, p. 8, State v. Jones, 254 N.C. 450, 119 S.E.2d 213" (1961):- -
1962]
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tions to the jury, this result still does not answer the important
questions that arise in the area of former jeopardy. Perhaps the
General Assembly may see a need to revise our law of principals and
accessories, as numerous other legislatures have done. 0 A clarifica-
tion is needed to remove the state of uncertainty that now exists.
WILLIAm R. HOKE
Evidence-Presumptions and Burden of Proof-Agency-Motor Ve-
biles-Identifying Markings
In 1947 the North Carolina Supreme Court in Carter v. Thruston
Motor Lines Inc.,' held that proof of identifying markings on a
commercial vehicle, taken in conjunction with adequate evidence of
negligent operation of the vehicle, was not sufficient to sustain the
necessary inferences of ownership, agency, and scope of employment2
to make out a prima facie case of respondeat superior liability against
the party suggested by the markings as being the owner. A note
writer in this Review at that time3 suggested that the difficulties of
proof frequently confronting plaintiffs in respect of ownership,
agency, and scope, as illustrated in that case, might well justify
judicial adoption of a rule by which the master-servant relationship
and scope of employment would be inferred from proof of ownership.
The court did not do so, but the legislature in 1951 enacted such a
rule in G.S. § 20-71.1,' which contained the additional element of
inferring ownership from proof of registration.
Whatever the intention of the legislature, the language of this
statute, that proof of the basic facts of ownership or agency shall "be
prima facie evidence" of the inferred essential facts invoking vicarious
liability, has proved a somewhat illusory weapon for plaintiffs. Since
it is couched in the language of prima facie evidence, and not of
presumption, and since it does not in terms shift the burden of proof
to the defendant, it has quite predictably5 been construed to have no
"-See statutes cited notes 13 and 14 supra.
*227 N.C. 193, 41 S.E.2d 586 (1947).
2 Scope of employment will hereafter be referred to as "scope.
'Note, 25 N.C.L. REv. 491 (1947).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-71.1 (1953).
' Interpretative difficulties are inevitable whenever a statute uses the terms
"prima facie evidence," or "presumption," without further directive as to
what if any effect is intended to be had upon pleading burden, burden of
proof, and probative force by virtue of the operation of statutory prima facie
evidence or presumptions. There is no unanimity as to (1) the distinctions,
if any, between prima facie evidence and presumption as concepts; (2) their
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other effect than to provide immunity against a motion to nonsuit"
at the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence." It does not have the effect
of shifting to defendant any more than the administrative burden
of going forward with the evidence.' Upon the offering of uncon-
tradicted evidence which, directly opposes the inferred facts of agency
and scope, the defendant is entitled to a peremptory instruction s in
effect upon the burden of proof when only these terms are used; (3) what
probative force, if any, is created thereby for jury consideration. See gen-
erally Gausewitz, Presumptions, 40 MINN. L. Rxv. 391 (1956); McBaine,
Burden of Proof: Presumptions, 2 U.C.L.A.L. Rxv. 13 (1954).
On the first point, Wigmore criticizes the widespread synonymous usage
of the terms prima facie evidence and presumption in the interest of accurate
terminology and clear doctrinal analysis. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §'2494 (3d
ed. 1940). The North Carolina court has equated "presumption of fact"
with prima facie evidence, both as to constituent elements and as to conse-
quences. See, e.g., In re Will of Wall, 223 N.C. 591, 27 S.E.2d 728 (1943).
But this court also recognizes and applies a "presumption of law," which has
different consequences in the material respects herein noted from the pre-
sumption of fact, or prima facie evidence. See, e.g., In re Will of Wall,
sup ra.
On the second and third points, two "schools" with powerful protagonists
have evolved. The Wigmore position, following Thayer, is that the burden
of proof in the ultimate sense "never shifts" by virtue of even a "true" pre-
sumption's operation. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2489 (3d ed. 1940). On the
other hand, Professor Morgan takes the position that a true presumption
should shift the risk of non-persuasion and require a meaningful instruction
to that effect to the jury. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 17-41
(1954). UNIFORM RULE OF EvIDENCE 14, reflecting influence from both
schools, announces a hybrid approach by which the ultimate burden shifts
only if the basic facts of the presumption "have any probative value as evi-
dence of the presumed fact." The basic divergence is reflected among vari-
ous courts. The North Carolina court, following its conceptual distinctions,
has traditionally held the "presumption of law" to effect a shift of the risk of
non-persuasion and require an instruction to that effect, but has denied these
consequences to the "presumption of fact." See generally Speas v. Mer-
chants Bank & Trust Co., 188 N.C. 524, 125 S.E. 398 (1924); McCormick,
Charges on Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 5 N.C.L. REv. 291, 295-97(1927). Thus, judicial announcement in a North Carolina opinion of ap-
proval of a "presumptive rule" can be followed in the same opinion by a
rejection of a "presumptive rule" in favor of a "prima facie rule" with no
illogic if the first presumptive rule is understood to refer to a presumption
of fact and the second to a presumption of law. Unexplained, such a juxta-
position is ambiguous and misleading. See note 18 infra.
o Knight v. Associated Transp., Inc., 255 N.C. 462, 122 S.E.2d 64 (1961).
Although the statute has only the limited effect pointed out in text, it
must be kept in mind that prior to its passage plaintiffs on this proof in this
type of case had no chance of getting to the jury. See Carter v. Thurston
Motor Lines, Inc., 227 N.C. 193, 41 S.E.2d 586 (1947) and text at note 1.
Knight v. Associated Transp., Inc., No. 171, N.C. Sup. Ct., October 10,
1962.
'Travis v. Duckworth, 237 N.C. 471, 75 S.E.2d 309 (1953). "When all
the evidence offered suffices, if true, to establish the controverted fact, the
court may give a peremptory instruction-that is, if'the jury find the facts to
be as all the evidence tends to show, -it will answer the inquiry in an indi-
cated manner. Defendant's denial of an alleged fact raises an-issue as to its
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his favor as a matter of right? even absent any special request.' 0
, In a recent case' plaintiff, suing the owner of a tractor-trailer unit
for -damages for personal injuries sustained in a highway collision,
offered as sole proof of ownership, agency, and scope of employment,
identifying markings which suggested defendant's ownership. Held,
that this evidence constitutes prima facie proof of ownership, agency,
and scope, but does not shift to the defendant the burden of proof in
the ultimate sense of the risk of non-persuasion. 2
Since G.S. § 20-71.1 was not in play in this case because of failure
to comply with the then applicable one year provision," this decision,
expressly overruling Carter v. Thruston Motor Lines Inc.,14 makes
available a new method, independently of that statute,15 for supplying
existence even though he offers no evidence tending to contradict that offered
by plaintiff. A peremptory instruction does not deprive the jury of its right
to reject the evidence because of lack of faith in its credibility. [Citations
omitted.] Such an instruction differs from a directed verdict as that term
is used by us. A verdict may never be directed when the facts are in dispute.
The judge may direct a verdict only when the issue submitted presents a
question of law based upon admitted facts." Chisholm v. Hall, 255 N.C. 374,
376-77, 121 S.E.2d 726, 728 (1961). It might be considered that plaintiff
still has received substantial aid from the statute since defendant must pro-
duce evidence to justify the peremptory instruction, and since presumably the
plaintiff, though unprepared to meet it, is protected as to its truthfulness by
the sanction of perjury. This sanction may well be a weak reed considering
the frequently shadowy line between agency and bailment. See Travis v.
Duckworth, supra.
'Whiteside v. McCarson, 250 N.C. 673, 110 S.E.2d 295 (1959).
"0 In further clarification of the statute's effect it was held to establish a
mere rule of evidence and not to eliminate the necessity of pleading both
agency and negligence. Hartley v. Smith, 239 N.C. 170, 79 S.E.2d 767
(1954).
" Knight v. Associated Transp., Inc., 255 N.C. 462, 122 S.E.2d 64 (1961).
The result reached in the principal case is in accord with the weight of
authority. E.g., Barber Pure Milk Co. v. Holmes, 264 Ala. 45, 84 So. 2d 345
(1955); Robinson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 257 Ill. App. 278 (1930). See
generally Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 167 (1952).
12 The trial judge, considering that Virginia law as to the burden of proof
applied in view of the Virginia locus of the collision, charged the jury, in
Eorrect -application of Virginia law, that the effect of this evidence was to
shift the burden of proof in the ultimate sense to the defendant. This was
held error for the lex fori rather than the lex loci applies to these "procedural
matters." The court then rejected the Virginia rule in favor of that pointed
out in text.
"' N.C. Sess. Laws 1951, ch. 494 removed by N.C. Sess. Laws 1961, ch.975.91'227 N.C. 193, 41 S.E.2d 586 (1947).
" Presumably, in a similar case arising where G.S. § 20-71.1 (a) could
be invoked, a more or less academic question could be presented as to the
mechanics of operation of the rule of Knight within the framework of G.S.
§ 20-71.1 (a). That is, will evidence of identifying markings supply the proof
of ownership contemplated by G.S. § 20-71.1 (a) so as thereupon to invoke
the operation of that statute, to create a "prima facie case" by its very terms,
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the hiatus in available proof of ownership, agency, and scope.16 -But
it was soon made clear that this method is to be of no greater service
to plaintiffs than are the inferences allowed by G.S. §20-71.1, as
construed. For, on new trial of the Knight" case, the trial court
was held to have committed error when it charged the jury in effect
that the prima facie rule announced on first appeal had the effect of
shifting the burden of proof in the ultimate sense to the defendant."s
It may well be that the legislature intended by G.S. § 20-71.1
to favor the plaintiff's over-all chances of success in this type case
in a more substantial way than merely to provide nonsuit immunity
or, will the rule of Knight continue to operate independently of that statute,
as it did in the Knight case? That this is a purely academic speculation is
indicated by the point, developed in text, that the prima facie rule of Knight
is perfectly corollary to the prima facie rule of the statute as interpreted.
"It is interesting to note although the statute does not go as far as the
court was asked to go in Thurston the court in Knight went beyond what
the statute provided by inferring agency and scope solely from identifying
markings without necessity of proof of ownership or registration. - -
Quaere whether the judicial extension of Knight raises a constitutional
question. If in a subsequent case the court determines that the judicial in-
ference of Knight is in effect provided for in the statute such a decision.
might well run into the settled rule that in order for a statutory presumption
to be held valid there must be some "rational connection" between the fact
to the proof of which the presumption is attached and the ultimate fact to
be established. Mobile J. & K.C. R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910).
The judicial extension moves proof of the necessary basic fact on which the
inferences are predicated one step further back from the critical fact of
agency. McCormick is of the opinion that statutory presumptions in regard
to civil cases will not be straight-jacketed to the extent that presumptions in
criminal cases are. MCCORM cK, EVIDENCE § 313 (1954).
17Knight v. Associated Transp., Inc., No. 171, N.C. Sup. Ct., October
10, 1962.
1
"Any confusion in the trial judge's instructions may fairly be traced to
some rather ambiguous language in the first Knight opinion in referring 'to
presumptions and prima facie cases: "In our opinion, the presumptive rule,
which is generally recognized throughout this country, is a just one, and
well-nigh necessary if those who happen to be injured by the negligent
operation of such equipment are to have the protection to which they arejustly entitled. Therefore, we hold that the evidence of the plaintiff in the
trial below was sufficient to make out a prima facie case, and the defendant's"
motion for judgment as of nonsuit was properly overruled. However, since
the court below used the Virginia presumptive rule in charging the jury, and
we now are adopting the prima facie rather than the presumptive rule, we
think the defendant is entitled to a new trial, and it is so ordered." Knight
v. Associated Transp., Inc., 255 N.C. 462, 467-68, 122 S.E.2d 64, 69 (1961).
When the court in the first Knight opinion distinguished between prima
facie cases and presumptions, it failed to make its further traditional distinc-
tion between presumptions of law and of fact. See note 5 supra. Presum-
ably, the court sought to distinguish the presumption of law, not the pye-
sumption of fact, from the prima facie case on the ground that the former
shifts the burden of proof in the ultimate sense. Failure to maintain and
reiterate this doctrinal analysis in which two kinds of presumptions are,
recognized can lead to the confusion indicated by the trial judge's instructions.
19621
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upon proof of the basic facts of ownership or registration. If so,
experience has demonstrated that the only way to accomplish this
with certainty is by a statutory provision expressly placing upon the
defendant the burden of proof in the ultimate sense.19
Until such time as a change of this type is made plaintiffs' coun-
sel must realize that exclusive reliance on either the inference created
by the present statute or the judicial inference adopted in the Knight
case is apt to lead into a trap. The total effect of either inference is
merely to take the plaintiff past a possible nonsuit at which point it
vanishes leaving him naked in respect of evidence to substantiate his
claim and open to an adverse verdict via a peremptory instruction in
favor of the defendant.
The best weapons with which a plaintiff's attorney can arm him-
self to combat the problem of adducing ultimately effective proof on
these frequently elusive elements are not the statutory inference nor
the judicial inference of Knight, but rather, extensive investigation
to discover more direct evidence of the ultimate facts of agency and
scope, pleadings20 designed to force admissions of both agency and
9 Massachusetts has a statute which in terms goes beyond the mere crea-
tion of a prima facie or presumptive rule to specify that the result of the
prima facie case of agency and scope made out shall be to shift the burden
to the defendant as an affirmative defense. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85A(1956). If a policy decision is made that more drastic leverage should be
given plaintiffs in respect of their ability to adduce ultimately effective proof
on these elements, this type statute must be used to insure the critical aspect
of shifting of burden of proof.
2 Good technical drafting and the code itself require that allegations of
each material fact be separately stated. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-122 (1953).
This may frequently force admission of the critical facts of agency and pos-
sibly scope, whereas if the same allegations are lumped in with other allega-
tions, a defendant may frequently, by use of a negative pregnant form of
denial, avoid admission with impunity.
The principal case would appear to furnish a rather good example of
pleading in a manner which increases the probability of the defendant's use
of a negative pregnant form of denial which, if unchallenged, successfully
avoids having to deny directly under verification the narrow facts of owner-
ship and agency. In a single paragraph the complaint alleged ownership,
agency and scope and all the facts leading up to the accident. The corre-
sponding paragraph in the answer reads: "The defendant denies that a trac-
tor-trailer unit, owned by it and being driven by one of its employees in the
course of his employment in a southerly direction on U.S. Highway #306,
negligently and carelessly crossed the center line of said highway and struck
the left fender of the tractor-trailer unit in which the plaintiff was riding
and continued to strike the left side of the tractor and trailer, thereby knock-
ing the plaintiff violently about the cab of said tractor, resulting in serious
and painful injuries to the plaintiff, or that a vehicle of the defendant col-
lided in any way with the truck in which the plaintiff was a passenger; that
as to the other allegations of paragraph III of the complaint, this defendant
has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
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scope, and extensive use of the available discovery procedures." In
view of the fact that in some instances even the combination of exten-
sive investigation and artfully drawn pleadings and discovery pro-
cedures may not supply the ultimately effective proof of these
elements, a statute expressly shifting the burden of proof to defendant
may be required.
MACK B. PEARSALL
Federal Income Taxation-Alimony and Support Payments-Effect
of Contingent Reduction Provisions in Property Settlements
The 1961 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Com-
missioner v. Lester' provides for simplicity of interpretation and
certainty of tax consequences where property settlement agreements
incident to divorce or separation are subject to contingent alteration.
Prior to 1942, a taxpayer who was divorced or legally separated
from his wife was generally not entitled to deduct alimony from
gross income.' The Revenue Act of 1942' changed this by requiring
a wife4 to include in gross income "periodic" payments received from
her husband made in discharge of a marital duty.5 A complimentary
or falsity of the same, and the same are therefore denied." Record, p. 4,
Knight v. Associated Transp., Inc., 255 N.C. 462, 122 S.E.2d 64 (1961).
Conceivably, if the plaintiff had alleged ownership, agency, and scope in
separate paragraphs an admission of one or more then might have been
forced.
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-568.1-.27 (1953).
1366 U.S. 299 (1961), affirming 279 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1960), reversing
32 T.C. 1156 (1959).
1 Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 8 (1935); Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S.
151, 153 (1917). Alimony was deductible from gross income when the
divorce decree, settlement agreement, and state law operated as a complete
discharge of liability for support. Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U.S. 149, 156
(1940); Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U.S. 69 (1939).
S56 Stat. 798 (1942).
'For purposes of simplicity it is assumed the husband is paying alimony
or support; however, the statute covers a situation in which a wife is re-
quired to pay alimony to the husband. Elinor Stewart Sokol, 7 T.C. 567
(1946); Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §3797(a)(17) (now INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 7701 (a) (17)).
5Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(k), added by ch. 619, 56 Stat. 816 (1942)
(now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71), provided "periodic payments .. . re-
ceived . . . in discharge of . . . a legal obligation which, because of the
marital or family relationship, is imposed upon or incurred by such husband
under ... a written instrument ... shall be includible in the gross income
of such wife .... This subsection shall not apply to that part of any such
periodic payment which the terms of the... written instrument fix, in terms
of... a portion of the payment, as a sum which is payable for the support
of minor children of such husband."
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provision allowed a husband to deduct from gross income payments
his wife was required to include.6
If the decree or agreement provides for a single sum payable to
the wife for the support of herself and minor children of the marriage,
with no allocation of the payment between the parties, no difficulty
is experienced. The wife is clearly taxable on the entire sum.1
Where the agreement or decree makes a provision for the minor
children in a definite sum or proportion, it is just as clear that the
wife is not taxable on this amount.' However, in agreements where
the husband attempts to make flexible provision for both a wife and
minor children, subject to reduction as the wife's household becomes
smaller, the payments have not-always .been clearly allocable between
alimony and child support. The Lester decision settled this problem
by holding that before any of the payment is excluded from the wife's
income the agreement must specify a sum certain or a percentage of
the payment which is fixed for child support.
.- The -Tax. Court -with supporting decisions in the First,"
Seventh,' .2 and Ninth" Circuits, held that if there were a reasonable
indication or -inference that any portion of a payment was intended
to be payable for child support then such portion was not includible
in the gross income of the wife. In Eisinger v. Commissioner,14 a
decision exemplary of the Tax Court approach, the agreement pro-
, ' Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(u), added by ch. 619, 56 Stat. 816 (1942)
(now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 215). The statute was enacted to relieve the
husband from the burden of paying alimony plus the higher taxes which were
anticipated during the war. It was envisioned that in many instances the
husband would not'have'enough money to make both payments. H.R. REi.
No. 2333,-77th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1942).7 Joslyn v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1956); see Richard P.
Prickett, 18 T.C. 872 (1952). The same result follows regardless of the
amount actually expended on the minor children by the wife. Constance B.
Kirby, 35 T.C. 306 (1960); Frances Hummel, 28 T.C. 1131 (1957); Hen-
rietta S. Seltzer, 22 T.C. 203 (1954); Dora H. Moitoret, 7 T.C. 640 (1946).
8 J.ohn W. Harris, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1167 (1961); Earl S. Douglass,
30 P-H Tax Ct 1 Mem. 245 (1961); Martha J. Blyth, 21 T.C. 275 (1953),
aeq., 1954-1 CuM. BuL. 3.
0 Lester v. Commissioner, 366 U.S. 299, 303.
10 Russell W. Boettiger, 31 T.C. 477 (1958), acq., 1959-1 Cum. BuLL. 3;
Harold M. Fleming, 14 T.C. 1308 (1950); Warren Leslie, Jr., 10 T.C. 807
(1948). But see Elsa B. Chapin, 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 782 (1947) (con-
tingent reduction only if'wife'remarriied).
" Metcalf v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 288 (1st Cir. 1959).
1 Mandel v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d 50 (7th Cir. 1950).
1 Eisinger v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 303 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 913 (1958). Cf. Feinberg v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 260, 263 (3d
Cir. 1952) (dictum).
"Supra note 13.
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vided for specified reductions in weekly payments when a child
reached his majority or died. The agreement also provided that all
payments should cease upon the wife's remarriage and, in lieu thereof,
the husband was to pay the wife a certain amount for the support of
each child until he attained his majority or died. The court held that
the agreement "earmarked" with sufficient clarity the portions in-
tended for the support of minor children and alimony, and that when
such amounts could be readily determined without reference to con-
tingencies which might never occur, then such part of the periodic
payment was sufficiently "fixed" within the meaning of section 22 (k)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.'
The Second Circuit adopted a stricter view in Weil v. Commis-
sioner.'8 The only reduction there was contingent upon the wife's
remarriage. The court held that such a contingency did not suffi-
ciently allocate an amount payable for the support of minor children,
and that "sums are 'payable for the support of minor children when
they are to be used for that purpose only'-. ... [T] he wife must have
no independent beneficial interest therein."' 7
Baker v. Commissioner" was a forecast of how the Second Cir-
cuit would rule when a computation based on contingencies was in-
volved. In that case the taxpayer was obligated to pay his wife a
stipulated monthly sum, with no principal sum named in the agree-
ment. The payments were to cease in six years or if the wife should
remarry or die before the end of that period. The Commissioner and
the Tax Court disallowed a deduction for periodic alimony payments
on the theory that they could calculate the principal sum. 9 .The
Second Circuit reversed, and held that arriving at a principal sum
by calculation might be a sound principal if there were no contin-
15 See note 5 supra.
18240 F.2d 584 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 958 (1957). -
17Id. at 588; accord, Hirshon's Estate v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 497 (2d
Cir. 1957) (per curiam). As a result of Weil and Eisinger, Rev. Rul. 59-
93, 1959-1 Cum. BuLL. 22, was issued, stating that the Internal Revenue
Service would follow the Weil decision only in situations factually similar
(reductions contingent only upon wife's remarriage). To determine if a
portion of the payments made in accordance with a divorce decree or separa-
tion agreement is alimony or payable for child.support, the rationale of
Eisinger would be followed.
8 205 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1953); accord, Burton v. United States, 139
F.Supp. 121 (D. Utah 1956). 1
" Only "periodic" payments are considered alimony under 'the statute.
Payments which are considered "installments" on a principal sum, discharge-
able in 10 years or less, are not considered alimony. See Barrett v. United
States, 296 F.2d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 1961); Int. Rev. Code of 1939,§22(k)
(now INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 71 (c)).
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gencies involved; however, there was present a stipulated cessation
of the payments if the wife remarried or died. The possibility that
either of these contingencies might occur before termination was
sufficient reason to doubt the validity of the calculation.20
In accord with the Second Circuit is the Sixth Circuit decision of
Deitsch v. Commissioner,21 in which the court held that the term
"fix" as used in section 22 (k) was not ambiguous and that "It there-
fore must be construed in its usual sense of 'to assign precisely...
to make definite and settled.' ",22 Thus the decisions in the Second
and Sixth Circuits clearly departed from the view of the Tax Court
and the First, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.
In order to resolve this conflict in the circuits, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Commissioner v. Lester.23  The agreeement
there provided for a monthly sum payable to the wife for both ali-
mony and child support, subject to reduction on occurrence of speci-
fied contingencies. All payments were to cease on the death of either
husband or wife, or upon her remarriage. Should either of the chil-
dren die, become emancipated, or marry, the payments were to be
reduced by one-sixth. The husband had deducted the entire payment
as alimony.
The Commissioner disallowed a portion of that deduction on the
grounds that a reasonable inference could be drawn that one-sixth
of each payment was intended to be "payable for" support of a minor
child. The Tax Court24 agreed with the Commissioner and held that
if it is clear from the terms of the agreement that a portion of the
payment is to be applied for the support and maintenance of minor
children, then such amount should be considered as a sum "fixed"
as payable for child support.
On appeal, the Second Circuit 25 looked to the complete discretion
" Compare Davidson v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1955) With
Eisinger v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 303 (9th Cir. 1957). In Davidson the
Ninth Circuit cited Baker and arrived at the conclusion that since no princi-
pal sum was stated the payments were periodic and includible in the wife's
gross income.
21249 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1957). The agreement here provided for reduc-
tions in monthly payments as each child reached the age of 18. Payments
were to cease altogether if both children should die or become emancipated.
Accord, Ashe v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 345 (6th Cir. 1961) (vife had
discretion in use of entire payment) (decided under both the 1939 and 1954
Codes). But see Budd v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1947) (per
curiam).rDeitsch v. Commissioner, supra note 21, at 536.
23366 U.S. 299 (1961).
J'erry Lester, 32 T.C. 1156 (1959).2 Lester v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1960).
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the wife retained in the use of the money and held the entire payment
to be alimony.2" The fact that, as the size of the family diminished,
the periodic payments were reduced in a fixed amount did not neces-
sarily mean that the wife's discretionary power had been diminished.
In reversing, the court held that if the agreement itself did not de-
clare a portion of the payment to be for the support of minor children,
then Congress intended to tax the wife on the entire payment.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Commissioner and the Tax
Court that the contingent reductions relating to the death, emanci-
pation, or marriage of the children might be a reasonable indication
of an intention by the parties to provide for the minor children, but
found that such a view is inconsistent with the further provision for
a complete cessation of the payments should the wife remarry. The
Court felt that this provision raised an equally sufficient indication
that the parties intended the entire payment to be alimony. To re-
solve this inconsistency, the Court resorted to the Committee Reports
of the House and Senate on the Revenue Act of 1942.27 As. origi-
nally proposed, section 22(k) provided that for the husband to be
taxable on any part of the payment, such part must be "specifically
designated" as payable for child support. This was changed to
"fixed" in the final draft of the statute in order to obtain more
"streamlined language."2 The Court held that it was the intention
of Congress that "the agreement must expressly specify or 'fix' a
sum certain or percentage of the payment for child support before any
of the payment is excluded from the wife's income."29
The Court has devised two tests to determine if any or all of a
periodic payment is "payable for" child support. The agreement
2 She retained control over the disposition of the payments, and could
allocate the money between herself and the minor children as she thought
best. "Indeed such a construction [the Tax Court's] would defeat what is
the basic meaning of such an agreement, for the mother is to be free to use
her judgment in allocating the collective unit among her children and her-
self." Id. at 357.
"
7 H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 71, 73 (1942) ; S. REP. No.
1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83, 86 (1942). The Court found that the statute
was enacted to resolve inconsistencies and uncertainties in the application of
the federal revenue laws because of varying restrictions on the use of un-
specified child support money among the several states, and to relieve the
husband of the burden of paying both alimony and the tax thereon.2 Hearings Before Senate Committee on Finance on H.R. 7378, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1942).
26 Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299, 303. The resort to legislative
history seems justified in the light of the ambiguity of the statute when ap-
plied to agreements of this type. See Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317
U.S. 476, 479 (1943); United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S.
534, 542 (1940) ; White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281, 292 (1938).
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must either (1) expressly state a sum certain or (2) give a percent-
age of the payment which is payable for child support. The deter-
mination of the sum allocated for this purpose cannot be left to infer-
ence or conjecture."0
The decision will probably result in a reduction in the quantity
of tax litigation in the alimony-support area since it is now clear to
the draftsman how agreements must be drawn to include periodic
alimony payments in a wife's gross income, or to exclude a portion
from her gross income if that is desirable.3 ' The decision is also a
guide for construction of agreements drawn in the past, since it is
clear that contingent provisions in property settlement agreements are
no longer subject to the "reasonable indication" approach of the
Commissioner. 2 Hardships will be created since Lester does apply
to agreements drawn when there was confusion as to the correct
manner of placing the tax burden on the intended party. The tax
burden has undoubtedly shifted in many instances, entitling the hus-
band to a refund, while creating a tax deficiency for the wife. This
deficiency will be limited to. the period open under the statute of
limitations, usually three years. 3 The husband may file a refund
claim for the period open under the statute as applicable to him.84
" "It is not enough to say that the sum can be computed." Commis-
sioner v. Lester, supra note 29, at 307 (concurring opinion).
" If none of the payment to the wife is fixed as child support, none of
it can'be applied to determine if the husband is entitled to a dependency ex-
emption deduction. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 152(b) (4).8 2 Lester has been followed by the Tax Court in Lindley S. Bettison, 30
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 946 (1961'); Robert E. Dolan, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 898
(1961); Estelle D. Deininger, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1153 (1961). In
Bettison the payments were reduced upon the wife's remarriage. The Tax
Court held that the agreement did not "fix" the amount remaining after
reduction as payable for child support. Even though the inference was
present that the husband was paying the money to support minor children,
the agreement did not expressly state a sum certain or percentage which was
payable for child support. In Bettison the reduced payments were made
under the same provision as the full payment. Quaere, if the agreement
provided, as in Eisinger, that all payments of alimony to the wife were to
cease, and in lieu thereof, a stipulated smaller sum to be paid for the support,
maintenance, and education of minor children? A more equitable solution
might be to include the full payment in the wife's gross income until the
contingent reduction provisions mature. At this time if the reduced payment
is more clearly identified as payable for the support of minor children, it
should not be deductible by the husband.
'* INT. Rv. -CODE OF 1954, § 6501(a). However, if the taxpayer has
omitted from gross income an amount in excess of 25% of the amount stated
in the return, the government's allowable period for assessment is extended
to six years. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 6501 (e) (1) (A). The period may
be extended by agreement of the parties before expiration of the statutory
period. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6501(c) (4).
", INT. REV. CODE Or 1954, § 6511(a).
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For closed years, if any are involved, it would seem that the hus-
band's possibility of redress is only that available through mitigation
of the statute of limitations.35
While Lester creates some problems of hardship, the benefits of
simplicity of interpretation and certainty of tax consequences are
much to be desired in applying the federal revenue laws. The de-
cision has also settled a confusing conflict of circuit court authority
in construing property settlement agreements containing contingent
reduction provisions in the event of death or remarriage of the wife,
death of the husband, or because minor.children become of age, die,
or marry. These factors may justify the triumph of form over sub-
stance in this instance, but no extension of that approach is advocated,
either in the federal tax field or other branches of the law.86
MARION A. COWELL, JR.
Federal Income Taxation-Leases-Amortization of Ground Rents
Not infrequently a taxpayer will purchase real property subject to
an outstanding lease. In many instances the lessee will have erected
improvements on the leased land. By virtue of having made a capital
investment in those improvements and avowedly retaining owner-
ship of them until the termination of the lease, the lessee is entitled
to an annual depreciation deduction.' In cases where both these fac-
"' In cases where the parties are "related taxpayers" under the statute, for
instance when the wife is beneficiary under an alimony trust, there appear to
be possibilities of mitigation. Eleanor B. Burton, 1 T.C. 1198 (1943);
Katharine C. Ketcham, 2 T.C. 159 (1943), aff'd, 142 F.2d 996 (2d Cir.
1944); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1311-1314. See generally 2 MERTENS,
FEDERAL INCoME TAXATION ch. 14 (rev. 1961) ; Scheifly, The Operation of
Sections 1311-1314, 13 U. So. CAL.. 1961 TAX INST. 509; Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d
538 (1957).
The doctrine of res judicata applies to tax litigation when the case con-
cerns the same issue for the same tax year, while for subsequent years the
doctrine of collateral estoppel applies. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S.
591 (1948); Tait v.' Western Md. Ry., 289 U.S. 620 (1933). See generally
10 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOMmE' TAXATION ch. 60 (rev. 1958); Griswold,
Res .udicata in Federal Tax Cases, 46 YALE L.J. 1320 (1936-37); Arinot.,
92 L.ED. 913 (1948).
" No cases have been found construing the applicable North Carolina
statutes. However, since the laws are extremely similar, especially in the
provisions relating to deduetibility of child support payments, the need for
clarity, certainty, and conformity in the construction and application of
revenue laws, both state a d federal; should lead the courts of North Caro-
lina to adopt the rule in Lester. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-141 (a), -141.2,
-147(21) (1958).
'Duffy v. Central R.R. of N.J., 268 U.S. 55 (1925); Hotel Kingkade v.
Commissioner, 180 F.2d 310 (10th Cir. 1950).
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tors are present the purchase price, which is unavoidably determined
to some extent by the ground rent' yielded by the outstanding lease,
may well reflect a premium over what would be paid for a similar
tract of land without a favorable lease.' Has the purchaser in such
event acquired only non-depreciable land, or has he acquired in addi-
tion a wasting asset4 in the right to receive future ground rent? If
the wasting asset is part of his investment will he be able to amortize,
over the unexpired term of the lease, that portion of the purchase
price attributable to this right?
In World Publishing Co. v. Commissioner" the Eighth Circuit
held that the taxpayer acquired a wasting asset in these ground rents,
and would be allowed to amortize, over the remaining life of the lease,
that portion of the purchase price allocable to this wasting asset.
There the taxpayer bought land which the vendor-lessor had leased
for a term of fifty years for an annual rental of $28,500. At the time
of the purchase there were twenty-eight years remaining in the term.
The purchaser paid $700,000 for the land and outstanding lease. He
contended that the difference between the total purchase price and
the fair market value of the land was paid for the right to receive
future rentals ;6 since this was a wasting asset, he should be allowed
2 The phrase 'ground rent' or 'ground rentals' means the money received
under a lease for the use of the land alone. This term as used in this note
is to be distinguished from the term ground rent as used in Maryland, Penn-
sylvania, and Michigan meaning an interest in land. A typical example of a
Maryland, Pennsylvania, or Michigan ground rent is where A conveys to B
and his heirs and assigns in fee simple, with the provision that B and his heirs
and assigns pay annual rent forever to the grantor, his heirs and assigns.
Pronzato v. Guerrina, 400 Pa. 521, 524 n.1, 163 A.2d 297, 298 n.1 (1960).
Ground rent, as an interest in land, is distinct and separate from the land out
of which it issues. Marburg v. Mercantile Bldg. Co., 154 Md. 438, 442, 140
Atl. 836, 838-39 (1928).
'A favorable lease is one in which the reserved rentals are greater than
the rentals which could be obtained currently on the same premises. Con-
versely, in an unfavorable lease the reserved rentals are less than the rentals
which could have been obtained if the purchaser were in a position to lease
the property to another in the current market. See Rubin, Depreciation of
Property Purchased Subject ta a Lease, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1134 (1952).
"A wasting asset is intangible property, as compared with depreciable,
tangible property, which is characterized by a progressive loss of value
extending over a series of taxable years. Due to the passage of time, a
wasting asset will eventually become worthless, either because it stops pro-
ducing income, as does a patent, or the very thing ceases tb exist, as does the
right to receive rent in the principal case. See 512 W. Fifty-Sixth St. Corp.
v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 942, 944 (2d Cir. 1945).
'299 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1962).
o Here the fair market value of the land was $400,000. The difference
of $300,000 is the amount attributable to the right to receive ground rents.
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to amortize or depreciate7 the difference over the remaining life of
the lease.8
The question of whether one, who acquired land subject to an out-
standing lease, had the right to amortize, first arose where the tax-
payer was an heir or devisee of the lessor. In such a situation the
courts have repeatedly denied the heir or devisee the right to amor-
tize or depreciate. The courts reasoned that since neither the de-
visor nor devisee had any capital investment in the leasehold, there
was no depreciable interest which could be acquired by the devisee.10
Commissioner v. Moore,'1 involving a devise of property subject
to an outstanding lease, was the first case to allow amortization of
7 While depreciation and amortization are basically the same, there is the
distinction that the former applies to tangible property and the latter to
intangible property. Since rentals are intangible, amortization is the proper
designation for the deduction allowance. It should be noted that throughout
the opinion in World Publishing, the court makes no distinction between
amortization and depreciation. While both are methods which enable the
taxpayer to recover his investment, depreciation allows a more rapid write-
off in the earlier years. Amortization over the life of the property is in
effect a form of depreciation known as the straight line method. That is,
the same amount is deducted each year. See Treas. Regs. § 1.167(b)-i(1962). But there is another method of depreciation called the declining
balance which allows for the first year a 150% deduction of the applicable
straight line rate. See Treas. Regs. § 1.167(b)-2 (1962). For example,
under the straight line method, if the first year's deduction was $100 for
property with an adjusted basis of $1000 and a useful life of 10 years, then
the deduction under the declining balance method for the first year would
be $150. In three years the deduction allowed under the former method
would be (3 X $100) = $300, while under the latter method it would be
. $385.88. This allowance of 150% of the straight line rate is applicable to
new or used property acquired after December 31, 1953. Rev. Rul. 60-8,
1960-1 Cum. BULL. 113; Rev. Rul. 57-352, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 150.
' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167(a) provides as a depreciation deduction,
an allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable
allowance for obsolescence of property held for the production of income.)
' See, e.g., Schubert v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 573 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 960 (1961) ; Goelet v. United States, 266 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1959) ;
First Nat'l Bank v. Nee, 190 F.2d 61 (8th Cir. 1951); Commissioner v.
Pearson, 188 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1951); Friend v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d
959 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 673 (1941).
" The general situation with the heir or devisee was that he acquired the
real property or an interest in it which was subject to an outstanding lease.
He contended that since the estate tax valuation of the property and lease
operated to furnish a new basis for determining gain or loss from the sale
or other disposition of the property, and to the extent that depreciable prop-
erty entered into it, for the depreciation of the property, then he should be
allowed a basis for depreciation of the property he acquired. The court re-jected this reasoning by saying unless the property is depreciable, the statu-
tory provisions providing a basis for depreciation are irrelevant. These
provisions only provide a basis upon which depreciation is to be computed
and does not create or amplify depreciability. First National Bank v. Nee,
supra note 9, at 64; Schubert v. Commissioner, supra note 9, at 579.
11207 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 942 (1954).
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the right to receive ground, rents-limited, however, to the pre-
mium."2 In Moore the court's decision reflected the true contentions
of the taxpayer; that is, he was not trying to depreciate or amortize
the improvements built by the lessee, but rather his interest in the
rentals.' 'In World Publishing there is'the factual difference, which
Friend v. Commissioner'-4 intimated* might result in allowing the
taxpayer to amortize, that the taxpayer 'invested money in what he
considered to be income producing property.
The commissioner based his attack on the fact that the purchaser
in World Publishing acquired only what the original lessor had, and
this had not included any depreciable interest in the lessee-constructed
building.-" In support of this argument he relied on the inheritance
"Z There is no real difference in the premium approach and the valuation
approach used in the principal case. Using the valuation approach, the tax-
payer is allowed to amortize the difference between the total purchase price
and the fair market value of the land. With the premium approach the
amortizable deduction is that amount, in excess of the value of the land,
which a purchaser would be willing to pay to get a return equal to the amount
of the existing rentals.
Under the valuation approach, the amount to be amortized is easily ascer-
tained by subtracting the fair market value of the land from the total pur-
chase price. That figure is $300,000. Since he paid $700,000 to get a return
of $28,500 a year, the rate of return is about 4%. Since the premium could
be calculated by comparing the capitalized value of the future rentals for the
remaining years under the lease, as it existed when the heir or devisee ac-
quired the property, with the capitalized value of an identical lease made
presently, the question is what amount in addition to the value of the land
would a purchaser pay to receive $28,500 annually? Based on a 4% return,
this can be calculated as follows: 4% X Total Price-= $28,500. This figure is
again $700,000. Since the value of the land was $400,000, the additional
amount is what the purchaser would pay, and is the amount allowed to be
amortized.
1 The taxpayer in Friend v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 959 (7th Cir. 1941),
made the same contention. But there the court said to be entitled to depre-
ciation or amortization the taxpayer must have made an investment in the
leasehold, and, since the taxpayer denied. that there had been any cost to
the estate in the acquisition of these leases, there can be no loss to be recovered
by amortization or depreciation.
The right to receive rent for twenty-eight years in World Publishing is
analogous to patents or copyrights. With a patent which has a finite life
of seventeen years, a taxpayer, should he buy the patent, would enjoy the
income it produces for all seventeen years. In Buckwalter v. Commissioner,
61 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1932), it was held'that a patent is a wasting asset
which may be amortized over its-life where it is used in the taxpayer's trade
or business or when it is held for the production of income. After this
time the patent would be worthless. In World Publishing, assuming the value
of the land remained stable, at the end of the lease the property would only
be worth $400,000. Here the passage of time not only eliminates further
income-it reduces the value of the investment.
, 119 F.2d 959 (7th Cir. 1941).
1 The lower courts properly agreed -with the commissioner that the heir
or devisee had no present depreciable interest in the building or other im-
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cases which held that neither the decedent nor his successor has any
interest in the leasehold. In Schubert v. Commissionwr,0 it, was
held that an heir or devisee cannot acquire a larger interest than
that of the decedent. The court in World Publishing rejected this
argument on grounds that it is illogical to allow a purchaser to.de-
preciate where the vendor-lessor is the builder, but to deny the pur-
chaser the deduction where the lessee is the builder. This approach
may result in further confusion, because the purchaser is not trying
to depreciate the improvements themselves, but is instead, seeking
to amortize his investment made for the future ground rentals.
Where the building or other improvements are erected by the lessee
who retains the title until the termination or default of the lease,
notwithstanding the decision in the principal case, the rule remains
that the purchaser (or heir) is not entitled to depreciate these im-
provements.17  Since the purchaser or heir acquired no interest in
the improvements, he is not concerned with their useful life.' The
building could be destroyed or condemned long before the expiration
of the lease and still the lessee would have to pay the annual rent for
the full term. Likewise, had there been no improvements made by the
lessee, the result in World Publishing would have been the same.
In arriving at the amount which the taxpayer is allowed to amor-
tize there is an additional factor to be considered. Should the useful
life of the building exceed or be shorter than the unexpired term of
the lease, the fair market value" of the building at the time of the
provements made by the lessee, but were in error when they concluded that
the devisee had no interest that could be depreciated or amortized. When the
estate was evaluated for estate tax purposes, the capitalized value of the fu-
ture rentals was included in the gross estate. The devisee had an interest in
the right to receive the rentals.
10286 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1961).
'T Since the taxpayer is amortizing his investment in the right to receive
rentals, and not the improvements made by the lessee, the right to depreciate
them is left to the lessee. In the principal case, the court said: "What is
significant is that each taxpayer . . . meets the statutory requirements for
depreciation. To allow each to recover his own, and separate, investment is
not, as is suggested, to permit duplication at the expense of the revenues and
is not to permit one taxpayer to depreciate another's investment. That each
is concerned with the same building is of no relevance." 299 F.2d at 622.
8 Useful life is that period of time during which the depreciable property
will be reasonably useful to the particular taxpayer in his trade or business.
Treas. Regs. § 1.167(a)-1 (b) (1962).
"o The lessor's interest in the building on the date of surrender is the fair
market value of the building and not its adjusted base. This is especially
true in the case where the life of the lease exceeds the useful life of the
building, because the adjusted base'may vary according to the method of de-
preciation the lessee employs. See note 8 supra. The determination of the
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termination of the lease must be figured in the total purchase price
in order that the amount to be amortized can be computed. In the
principal case the parties stipulated that the useful life of the building
did not exceed the remaining term of the lease. Since the taxpayer
is trying to arrive at an estimated value of the building for the pur-
pose of computing the amount to be amortized, the fair market value
of the building at the end of the lease will not be sufficient for his
present needs. A building worth so much in the future will not be
worth the same at the present time. To arrive at the correct amount,
it is necessary to know what a building would be worth to a buyer
today when he would be unable to enjoy possession until a later date.
This would be the discount value, and is the amount one would pay
presently for the future right of possession. It is suggested that
the decision should be limited to the extent that the maximum amount
allowed to be amortized should not be greater than the difference
between the total price and the fair market value of the land increased
by the discount value of the building.
The decision in the principal case may affect another issue which
was not raised. If amortization of the wasting asset is correct when
the purchaser buys and retains the ground subject to a lease, what
are the results should he sell or exchange his right to receive future
rentals? In Hort v. Commissioner" a devisee acquired land subject
to an outstanding lease. During a period of depression, he and the
lessee agreed that for a stipulated sum the lessee could surrender the
lease. The Court held that this payment was a substitute for future
rentals, and, as such, was a recognized gain. As a result of the prin-
cipal case, if the taxpayer is allowed to amortize that portion of the
purchase price allocable to the right to receive future rentals, it would
seem that he could treat the amount received on the sale of this right,
to the extent of its then adjusted basis,21 as a return of capital and
not as gain of any character. Any amount received in excess of the
adjusted basis would be recognized gain.
Should the Supreme Court of the United States eventually ap-
amount of the lessor's interest is necessary in order to compute how much
he will be able to amortize. This is not to be confused with what the lessor's
basis would be, or whether such improvements would be considered as income
or not. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 1019 provides that the basis of the lessor's
real property shall not be increased or diminished by reason of his acquiring
the lessee-made improvements on the termination of the lease.
2- 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
2" The adjusted basis for the lessor would be cost of the building minus
depreciation deductions allowed to the lessee. See Treas. Regs. § 1.1011-1
(1962).
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prove the ruling in the principal case, its holding would permanently
lay to rest the commissioner's contention, suggested by Schubert,
that one cannot obtain more rights than one's devisor or vendor had.
As pointed out in World Publishing the problem should be analyzed
on the basis of what the taxpayer has rather than what a prior lessor
may have had. From this point of view World Publishing and
Moore are in accord.
BORDEN R. HALLOWES
Insane Persons-Involuntary Commitment Procedures-Due Process
North Carolina's statutory commitment procedure has been put
together in a piecemeal manner' and does not readily conform to any
pattern of laws applicable in other jurisdictions.2 The General
Assembly, recognizing the special problems concerning care of the
mentally ill, has constantly striven to modernize the old law.' In
what has appeared to be cognizance of this endeavor, the court has
taken judicial notice of the fact that commitment of a mentally ill
person involves a procedure unlike any other.4
For example, in the case of In re Harris,5 the court overruled
previous decisions6 and enlarged the writ of habeas corpus to the
' See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-35.1 to -68.1 (1958), as amended, N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 122-36 to -68.1 (Supp. 1961).
For graphic comparisons of all state procedures see LiNDMAN & MCIN-
TYRE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 44-106 (1961); Ross, Com-
mitment of the Mentally Ill; Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L. REv.
945, 1008-16 (1959). Nonconformity by North Carolina is not in itself
damning, for there is little conformity between the states as to any type of
commitment procedure. See LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, supra; Ross, supra.
An attempt to gain uniformity was made in 1950 by the preparation of a
"Draft Act" which was sent to all the state governors as a working model to
be adapted to local needs and conditions. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL
HEALTH, FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, A DRAFT ACT GOVERNING HOSPITILI-
ZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL (Public Health Service Pub. No. 51, 1951).
Approximately ten states have adopted the Draft Act in whole or in part.
Slovenko & Super, Commitment Procedures in Louisiana, 35 TUL. L. REv. 705
n.2 (1961).
'There have been over forty changes since 1958 dealing with mental
health. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 122 (Supp. 1961). Twenty-two of these
deal directly with commitment procedures. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-36 to
-91 (Supp. 1961).
'Involuntary commitment proceedings are, strictly speaking, neither a
civil action nor a special proceeding. In re Cook, 218 N.C. 384, 11 S.E.2d
142 (1940). This "creates a problem only in the minds of those who are not
familiar with the distinction between a hospitalization proceeding and a
criminal or civil trial." Whitmore, Comments on a Draft Act for the Hos-
pitalization of the Mentally Ill, 19 GEo. WASH. L. Rxv. 512, 524-25 (1951).
241 N.C. 179, 84 S.E.2d 808 (1954).
E.g., In re Chase, 193 N.C. 450, 137 S.E. 305 (1927).
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extent that it now provides for a judicial determination as to the
person's sanity at the time that the writ is issued,7 while also serving
its historical purpose of testing the legality of the original detention.
This meang simply that no commitment is "final."'  Now the writ
can be used in the form of an appeal,9 thus acting as a further safe-
guard to prevent the continuing incarceration of a person of sane
mind.
In the recent case of In re Wilson,10 the petitioner was indeter-
minately committed to a mental hospital through the use of North
Carolina's "standard" procedure:"
(1) Filing of an affidavit before the clerk of the superior court
requesting an examination of an alleged mentally ill 2 person ;"3
(2) Issuance of an order by the clerk directing two physicians
to personally examine the proposed patient.14
(3) Certification by the physicians, service of notice to the pro-
posed patient, and the conducting of a hearing by the clerk;1"
(4) Upon determination by the clerk that the person is in need
of care and treatment, commitment to a mental hospital for an obser-
vation period;16
TN.C. GEN. STAT. § 17-33 (2) (1958) provides for release "Where, though
the original imprisonment was lawful, yet by some act, omission, or event
which has taken place afterwards, the party has become entitled to be dis-
charged." The court stated that the "recovery from a mental disease after
commitment to an institution would seem to be an 'event which has taken
place afterwards' . . ." within the meaning of the statute and held that the
petitioner was entitled to be released. 241 N.C. at 181, 84 S.E.2d at 809.
' This is used in the context that a person committed has no means of
release except by will of the hospital authorities or some other nonjudicial
authority.
'Hiatt v. Soucek, 240 Iowa 300, 36 N.W.2d 432 (1949).
10257 N.C. 593, 126 S.E.2d 489 (1962).
This procedure is not to be confused with admittance by medical certifi-
cation as provided in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-62.1 (Supp. 1961) or emergency
commitment as provided in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-57 (Supp. 1961).
12 "[A]n illness which so lessens the capacity of the person to use his
customary self control, judgement, and discretion in the conduct of his affairs,
and social relations as to make it necessary and advisable for him to be under
treatment, care, supervision, guidance, or control." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-
35.1 (1958).
'
3 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-42 (1958).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-43 (Supp. 1961). The physicians cannot be
related by blood or marriage to the proposed patient or directly connected
with the hospital of commitment. Ibid.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-46 (Supp. 1961).
" Ibid. The period is originally for sixty days. This may be extended
another four months upon request of the hospital authorities and by order of
the clerk. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-46.1 (Supp. 1961). This procedure was
followed in the principal case. 257 N.C. at 594, 126 S.E.2d at 489.
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(5) At the end of the observation period, filing of a report by
tl1e hospital authorities stating their conclusions ;17
(6) Indeterminate commitment ordered by the clerk if the "facts
may warrant.'
8
After mote than two years of treatment a writ of habeas corpus
was filed. The writ challenged the legality of the petitioner's confine-
ment on the grounds that indeterminate commitment, following the
observation period, without benefit of a prior notice and right to a
second hearing, violated her rights under article I, section 17 of the
constitution of North Carolina, and under the due process clause of
the 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 9 The
court agreed with this line of reasoning and held that the petitioner
was being deprived of her liberty without benefit of due process of
law." As interpreted it would appear that this adherence to strict
due process requirements has placed a considerable barrier in the
path of future advances in realistic mental health legislation.
There is a split of authority with regard to due process require-
ments 2' and the mentally ill person's right to notice and hearing.
The majority2 holds that commitment without judical authority,2"
and thus without notice and hearing, does not violate procedural
due process, if there is an immediate right of appeal,24 or provisions
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-46.1 (Supp. 1961).1 Ibid.
10257 N.C. at 595, 126 S.E.2d at 490-91.
20 Id. at 597, 126 S.E.2d at 492. The court interpreted the power granted
the clerk to indeterminately commit "as the facts may warrant" under N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 122-46.1 (Supp. 1961) to mean that the patient must first be
given notice and a right to a hearing. Thus the court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the statute but condemned the interpretation.2
' For a complete and intricate analysis of this subject see Kadish, Meth-
odology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication---A Survey and Criterion,
66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957).
"2 Kadish, A Case Study in the Significance of Procedural Due Process-
Institutionalizing the Mentally Ill, 9 WESTERN POLITICAL Q. 93, 111 (1956) ;
Hearings Before the Subconimittee on, Constitutional Rights on the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 92-3 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as 1961 Hearings].
" A procedure is not judicial unless the court has discretion to determine
whether or not an individual should be committed. "The mere fact that a
judge must sign a hospitalization order or make a perfunctory examination of
the hospitalization papers has not been sufficient to classify the procedure asjudicial." LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 23.24 Payne v. Arkebauer, 190 Ark. 614, 80 S.W.2d 76 (1935); Ex parte
Scudamore, 55 Fla. 211, 46 So. 279 (1908); In re Bryant, 214 La. 574, 38
So. 2d 245 (1948) ; Dowdell, Petitioner, 169 Mass. 387, 47 N.E. 1033 (1897) ;
accord, In re Coates, 9 N.Y.2d 242, 213 N.Y.S.2d 74, 173 N.E.2d 797 (1961).
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for filing a writ of habeas corpus that will test the question of sanity.25
The minority requires notice and right to a hearing.26 Most of the
minority decisions are distinguishable on the grounds that adequate
review procedures were not available.27 It should be noted that in
all the cited cases the question before the court was whether or not
notice and the right to a hearing is required prior to indeterminate
commitment without benefit of a prior observation period or prior
hearing, both of which were present in Wilson.
There has been no prior case law in this jurisdiction concerning
this particular point except In re Boyette 8  There the court held
unconstitutional a statute permitting a judge to commit a person to a
mental hospital after acquittal from a homicide case on the grounds
of insanity. The statute in question provided no means of release
except by act of the General Assembly. The decision was based on
the propositions that the statute provided for no hearing before
commitment, and that after commitment there were no provisions
for judicial review.
Much of the Boyette decision was based upon the latter proposi-
tion.29 It is important to note that at the time of this decision the
writ of habeas corpus had not been enlarged 0 and that a person so
" Hammon v. Hill, 228 Fed. 999 (W.D. Pa. 1915); Paul v. Longino, 197
Ga. 110, 28 S.E.2d 286 (1943); Hiatt v. Soucek, 240 Iowa 300, 36 N.W.2d
432 (1949); People v. Terrance, 11 N.Y.2d 362, 229 N.Y.S.2d 737, 183
N.E.2d 752 (1962); Ex parte Dagley, 35 Okla. 180, 128 Pac. 699 (1912);
In re Crosswell, 28 R.I. 137, 66 Ati. 55 (1907); McMahon v. Mead, 30 S.D.
515, 139 N.W. 122 (1912).
" it re Lambert, 134 Cal. 626, 66 Pac. 851 (1901) ; In re Wellman, 3 Kan.
App. 100, 45 Pac. 726 (1896); State ex rel. Blaisdell v. Billings, 55 Minn.
467, 57 N.W. 794 (1893) ; State ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinax, 364 Mo. 858, 269
S.W.2d 72 (1954). Barry v. Hill, 98 F.2d 222 (D.D.C. 1938) has been
frequently cited supporting the minority rule but is distinguishable on the
grounds that a commitment statute was not involved.
" Ross, supra note 2, at 977. The only case that is not clearly distinguish-
able is State ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinax, supra note 26. An anomaly of the
minority rule is that in some instances the mentally ill person is not required
to be actually present at the hearing. In re Wellman, supra note 26. In
line with this reasoning are cases upholding the valadity of substitute notice.
See, e.g., Okerberg v. People, 119 Colo. 529, 205 P.2d 224 (1949) (notice to
guardian ad litem) ; In re Mast, 217 Ind. 28, 25 N.E.2d 1003 (1940) (notice
to attorney). Contra, Hunt v. Searcy, 167 Mo. 158, 67 S.W. 206 (1902).
For states that have statutory provisions utilizing substitute notice see LIND-
MAN & MCINYRE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 49-51. As to this possibility in
North Carolina-quaere.
28 136 N.C. 415, 48 S.E. 789 (1904).
Id. at.423-25, 48 S.E. at 792-93.
80 With an enlarged writ other courts have held this type of statute consti-
tutional. E.g., It re Clark, 86 Kan. 539, 121 Pac. 492 (1912); Ex parte
Brown, 39 Wash. 160, 81 Pac. 552 (1905).
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committed had no means of placing the question of his sanity before
any judicial authority.3 Thus the court in Wilson was not bound
by precedent.32
The court in Wilson by refusing to alleviate strict due process
restraints in the area of commitment has definitely placed North
Carolina in the bare minority. Due process is not so inflexible as
to prevent special procedure for special needs." The Supreme Court
of the United States has stated that "it would be unwise to construe
due process to meaning the strict application of notice and hearing," 4
but instead should be "adapted to the end to be attained."35
What then is the "end to be attained" ? The basic consideration
should be to serve the medical welfare of the sick while still protecting
their rights.3 In failing to take judicial notice of North Carolina's
" Boyette has been cited mainly for the proposition that although a per-
son has been committed via defective procedural due process, and thus en-
titled to discharge, he may temporarily be detained while proper proceedings
are initiated to recommit. E.g., Barry v. Hill, 98 F.2d 222 (D.D.C. 1938).
This procedure has been highly recommended. 1961 Hearings 334. It is in-
teresting to note that this procedure was not followed in Wilson although
there had been ample evidence for a finding that the petitioner was dangerous
to herself of others. 257 N.C. at 595, 126 S.E.2d at 490.
" See also Petition of Doyle, 16 R.I. 537, 18 Atl. 159 (1889) in which a
statute was held unconstitutional that did not permit a hearing prior to com-
mitment. After this decision the writ of habeas corpus was enlarged, as
North Carolina has done, and the court ruled that this cured the defect of
lack of notice and hearing prior to commitment. In re Crosswell, 28 R.I.
137, 66 Ad. 55 (1907). The Missouri court, holding in State ex rel. Fuller
v. Mullinax, 364 Mo. 858, 269 S.W.2d 72 (1954) that commitment by certi-
fication of two physicians violated due process even though provisions for
appeal and an enlarged writ were available seems to have been based on prece-
dent. For severe criticisms of this case see 68 H~Av. L. REv. 549 (1955)
and 31 N.D.L. REv. 94 (1955).
" As previously noted the majority of courts that have passed on the ques-
tion of due process requirements in the commitment field have relaxed the
need for notice and hearing. Cases cited notes 24-25 supra. Some authority
for flexible due process is found under the doctrine of parens patriae, in that
the legislature, as parens patriae may, to some extent, make provisions for
the care of those who are unable to care for themselves, as in cases of insane
persons and neglected children. E.g., Hammon v. Hill, 228 Fed. 999 (W.D.
Pa. 1915). For a criticism of this doctrine see Whitmore, supra note 4, at
522 n.18.
"' Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 427-28 (1953). See also Moyer v.
Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84 (1909).
" Hager v. Reclamation District, 111 U.S. 701, 708 (1884).
e Thus the direction is towards liberalized commitment procedures. See
generally GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, REPORT, COM1%MIT-
MENT PROCEDURES (No. 4, 1948); Kadish, A Case Study in the Significance
of Procedural Due Process-Institutionalizing the Mentally IU1, 9 WESTERN
POLITICAL Q. 93 (1956); Slovenko & Super, The Mentally Disabled, the
Law, and the Report to the American Bar Foundation, 47 VA. L. REv. 1366
(1961); Weihofen & Overholser, Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 24 TEXAS
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constantly improving mental health facilities8 7 and to couple this with
the realistic appeal procedure provided for by an enlarged writ, the
court completely ignored the patient's medical rights. The fact that
notice and a hearing may evolve into a painful traumatic experience
for a mentally ill individual is now fully appreciated."8 Notice to a
paranoid may cause him to flee, while notice to a depressive may
cause suicide.3 9 North Carolina, as a result of Wilson now requires
notice to be given not once, but twice. No other state so holds.
Has the court, by requiring application of strict due process,
really given a person more protection from being "railroaded" ?
Many states employ the same procedure for indeterminate commit-
ment that North Carolina utilizes for observational purposes.4" In
this state the observation period is utilized to further insure that a
sane person is not being deprived of his liberty. Only after the
hospital authorities have had a chance to observe the individual's be-
havior and have certified to the clerk that he is mentally ill is a
patient indeterminately committed. It is questionable that a second
notice and hearing at the end of the observation period would serve
any useful purpose. The only new evidence likely to be introduced
is the psychiatrists' testimony concerning the patient's behavior while
in the institution.42 This testimony will be exactly the same as is
L. REV. 307 (1946) ; Comment, Analysis of Legal and Medical Considerations
in Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 56 YALE L.J. 1178 (1947).
" North Carolina is ranked twenty-fourth as to adequacy of physicians in
public mental hospitals. 1961 Hearings 283. The state also has one of the
highest percentages of first patient releases. Over eighty per cent of first
admission patients are released within ninety days. Id. at 176. For a com-
plete survey of the present status of North Carolina mental hospitals see
STATISTICAL AND RESEARCH DIVISIONS OF N. C. HOSPITALS BOARDS OF CON-
TROL, TRENDS IN HOSPITALIZATION FOR MENTAL ILLNESS (1961).
" See, e.g., GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 295
(1952); GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, REPORT, COMMIT-
MENT PROCEDURES, op. cit. supra note 36; Ross, supra note 2, at 966.
' 1961 Hearings 81.
See generally Curran, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 31 N.C.L.
REV. 274, 293-97 (1953). Although the popular fears of "star chambers"
and "lettres de cachet" are still prevalent, "railroading" as such, is almost
nonexistent. Dr. Eugene Hargrove, Commissioner of Mental Health, has
stated that in the seventeen years he has been associated with mental institu-
tions he has not known of one single case. 1961 Hearings 176. This is also
true in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Slovenko & Super, supra note 36, at
1368. For a good example of a "railroading" case see Shields v. Shields, 26
F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Mo. 1939).
"' See LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 44-106; Ross, supra
note 2, at 1008-16. Other states have provisions for observational commit-
ment before indeterminate commitment, but the observation period is initiated
without notice and hearing.
,2 For the proponents of a second hearing it should be noted that the
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now forwarded to the clerk requesting indeterminate commitment.
If a sane person is by some chance being "railroaded" there is little
doubt that he would be released by the hospital or would have applied
for a writ under the doctrine of In re Harris43 by or before the time
that the observation period is terminated.
The effect of this decision is twofold: (1) A more expensive
court procedure is now required to commit, and (2) a definite hin-
drance has been introduced to the effective care and treatment of
patients through the adverse effect of a second notice and possible
second hearing.,
The possibilities of what course of action the next General Assem-
bly will take in light of this decision are innumerable. One possibility
already under consideration is to do away altogether with the obser-
vation period and have one hearing to decide indeterminate commit-
ment.4" Thus the final result of a decision meant to protect the con-
stitutional rights of the mentally ill may well cause them to:lose one
safeguard not afforded in any other state--an observation period
after hearing before final commitment.
GEORGE C. CocHAN
Real Property-Restrictive Covenants-Effect of Change of Condi-
tions on Enforcement.
It is well established that under appropriate circumstances equity
will invalidate privately imposed restrictive covenants limiting the
use of land in unified subdivisions.' In general this is deemed appro-
second hearing will be conducted by the same clerk that made the original
commitment. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-46.1 (Supp. 1961). The idea of a
"last ditch stand" with a battery of lawyers cross-examining the hospital
psychiatrists in order to secure the patient's release is inconceivable. If the
clerk had enough evidence to commit for the observation period it is ex-
tremely doubtful that his decision will change, for the psychiatric testimony
is in addition to the other positive evidence previously received and will serve
to bear out what the clerk had already decided-that the person is mentallyill.
"241 N.C. 179, 84 S.E.2d 808 (1954). It should be noted that there is
dictum in the principle case indicating that the court did not fully consider
the enlarged writ and its implications. 257 N.C. at 597, 126 S.E.2d at 492.
"Durham Morning Herald, Sept. 8, 1962. p. 1B, col. 6.
'This can result from two types of actions: affirmative relief granted to
parties seeking to have the restrictions lifted, or refusal of the court to issue
an injunction preventing violation of the restrictions. Either method being
equitable relief, may or may not also preclude a remedy at law. Some courts
hold the decree in equity extinguishes the covenant entirely, while others
maintain that mere unenforceability in equity does not preclude an action at
law for damages for breach of covenant. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 9.39, at 444-45 (Casner ed. 1952); 13 N.C.L. Rnv. 518 (1935).
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priate where the factors justifying the original imposition of the
restrictions have so changed that it is unconscionable to give further
effect to them.2
Application of this general principle involves resolution of two
subsidiary problems. First, where must the change of conditions,
making enforcement of the restrictions inequitable, occur? A basic
divergence of opinion has arisen as to whether a sufficient change
must have occurred within the restricted tract itself, whether changes
in the neighborhood surrounding the covenanted tract, considered
alone, justify nonenforcement, or whether the two may be considered
together to require non-enforcement. Second, and independent of
the first problem, is it appropriate to invalidate the restrictions
piece-meal when only some of the lots of a subdivision are directly
affected by the change? Here too, conflicting answers are found.
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in Tull v. Doctors Building,
Inc.,8 recently held that no change of conditions occurring outside
the covenanted area is to be considered in deciding whether restric-
tions are to be lifted.4 In the same decision it upheld the lower
court's expressed opinion that in any event release from restrictions
cannot be made piece-meal.5 These two holdings when applied in
combination represent the most conservative approach to the matter
possible, short of flat refusal to deny enforcement for any reason
except initial invalidity. Since few if any other courts appear to
follow this extreme approach,' an examination of its evolution in
North Carolina decisions and an evaluation of its practical operation
is in order.
Because change of conditions within the area necessarily involves
factors making available the equitable defenses of acquiescence,
estoppel, or laches against the party- opposing invalidation, such
change furnishes the strongest possible case for lifting the restric-
- See generally Starkey v. Gardner, 194 N.C. 74, 138 S.E. 408 (1927);
2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.39 (Casner ed. 1952); 5 POWELL, REAL
PROPERTY § 683-84 (1962); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 871-75 (3d ed.
1939); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 1111 (1949).
255 N.C. 23, 120 S.E.2d 817 (1961).
'Id. at 38, 120 S.E.2d at 827 (conclusion of law 2).
Id. at 41, 120 S.E.2d at 829-30 (discussion of law 5).
'While there is authority for either one holding or the other in a large
number of cases, the combination of the two is rarely announced. Rather, as
is suggested in 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.39, at 447 (Casner ed.
1952) courts denying piece-meal destruction commonly permit the entire
subdivision to be released by a surrounding change. See Fairchild v. Raines,
24 Cal. 2d 818, 151 P.2d 260 (1944) ; Talles v. Rifman, 189 Md. 10, 53 A.2d
396 (1947) ; Amerman v. Deane, 132 N.Y. 355, 30 N.E. 741 (1892).
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tions. 7 It is: quite clear then why the courts, including North Caro-
lina, see change of conditions within as furnishing the strongest
single ground for relief.' Still, many courts allow a change of condi-
tions outside the restricted tract, considered alone, to be sufficient
cause for the invalidation,' and most will take such change into con-
sideration when it is coupled with some change within the restricted
subdivision.'"
North Carolina seems unequivocally committed to the rule that
even a substantial change in the surrounding neighborhood will not
warrant release from the restrictions when there is not also evidence
of inside change." However, where there has been evidence of some
change within the tract, other North Carolina cases have held that
this, considered in conjunction with evidence of substantial change
outside the area, justifies lifting the restrictions.'2 In these latter
" There is a much more equitable basis for denying injunctive relief to a
complaining party himself at fault in respect to the changed condition within,
whether that fault be characterized as acquiescence, laches, estoppel or un-
clean hands, than for denying it to one who has had no means of control
over the development of a situation which he now seeks to halt.
Change of conditions within the area is probably more aptly characterized
generically by the term "abandonment," rather than "change of conditions."
The latter term should be reserved to define occurrences outside the area. 2
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.39, at 445-46 (Casner ed. 1952).
6 32 C.J. Injunctions § 328 & n.40 (1923) ; 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 87b (4)
(f). (1945).
See, e.g., Friesen v. City of Glendale, 209 Cal. 524, 288 Pac. 1080 (1930);
McClure v. Leaycraft, 183 N.Y. 36, 75 N.E. 961 (1905); Daniels v. Notor,
389 Pa. 510, 133 A.2d 520 (1957); Johnson v. Poteet, 279 S.W. 902 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1925) where injunctions seeking to prevent violations of covenants
were denied, and Wolff v. Fallon, 269 P.2d 630 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954),
aff'd, 44 Cal. 2d 695, 284 P.2d 802 (1955); Norris v. Williams, 189 Md. 73,
54 A.2d 331 (1947); and Welitoff v. Kohl, 105 N.J. Eq. 181, 147 Atl. 390
(Ct. Err. & App. 1929) where affirmative relief was granted.
" For cases wherein injunction against violation of residential restrictive
covenants was denied because changes had occurred both inside and outside
the restricted tract see Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862 (1933);
Harrigan v. Mulcare, 313 Mich. 594, 22 N.W.2d 103 (1946) ; Mathews Real
Estate Co. v. National Printing and Engraving Co., 330 Mo. 190, 48 S.W.2d
911 (1932); Wood v. Knox, 277 P.2d 982 (Okla. 1954). For decisions
granting affirmative relief see Alexander v. Title Ins. and Trust Co., 48 Cal.
App. 2d 488, 119 P.2d 992 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941); Goodwin Bros. v. Combs
Lumber Co., 275 Ky. 114, 120 S.W.2d 1024 (1938) ; Nashua Hospital Ass'n v.
Gage, 85 N.H. 335, 159 Atl. 137 (1932); Overton v. Ragland, 54 S.W.2d
240 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
"1 See Higdon v. Jaffa, 231 N.C. 242, 56 S.E.2d 661 (1949); Vernon v.
R. J. Reynolds Realty Co., 226 N.C. 58, 36 S.E.2d 710 (1946); Brenizer v.
Stephens, 220 N.C. 395, 17 S.E.2d 471 (1941).
2 Shuford v. Asheville Oil Co., 243 N.C. 636, 91 S.E.2d 903 (1956) ; Old-
ham v. McPheeters, 203 N.C. 141, 164 S.E. 731 (1932) ; Higgins v. Hough,
195 N.C. 652, 143 S.E. 212 (1928); Starkey v. Gardner, 194 N.C. 74, 138
S.E. 408 (1927).
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cases, although both were considered, there was no indication of
which factor was decisive, nor that either standing alone could have
been. There was then, until Tull, at least a possibility under this
line of cases that a substantial change outside could have tipped the
balance in favor of invalidation when coupled with change within
which, standing alone, would not have sufficed. The significance
of Tull in this regard is that it may indicate the end of this possi-
bility,"3 for there the court flatly refused to consider evidence of
outside change although there was also evidence of some change
within.'4
When faced with the problem of piece-meal destruction of the
restrictions, some jurisdictions allow them to be lifted on a few lots
at a time as they are affected." On the other hand, a majority of
courts require the covenants to be invalidated in toto or not at all.'
Unlike North Carolina, however, many jurisdictions which reject
such step-by-step lifting of restrictions do hold that an outside change
will warrant release from the restrictions even though there is no
change of circumstances within the restricted tract.' 7
" Advocates seeking to have an outside alteration considered in conjunc-
tion with some changes within in spite of Tull v. Doctors Building, Inc., may
be aided by the fact that all of the North Carolina authority relied upon in
that case consisted of cases showing absolutely no change within the cove-
nanted area. Higdon v. Jaffa, 231 N.C. 242, 56 S.E.2d 661 (1949); Vernon
v. R. J. Reynolds Realty Co., 226 N.C. 58, 36 S.E.2d 710 (1946); Turner v.
Glenn, 220 N.C. 620, 18 S.E.2d 197 (1942) ; Brenizer v. Stephens, 220 N.C.
395, 17 S.E.2d 471 (1941). In addition to pointing out that Tull based its
decision upon these cases which are distinguishable on the facts, one could
also show that there was no mention whatever of the more liberal line of
cases in North Carolina whose decisions were based on change both within
and in the surrounding area. See cases cited note 12 supra. Failure to
expressly overrule these decisions should be significant.
" The existence of change both inside and outside of the tract is indicated
in the findings of fact 20-34. Tull v. Doctors Building, Inc., 255 N.C. at 31-
32, 120 S.E.2d at 822-23. At 255 N.C. 39-40, 120 S.E.2d 828-29, the court ad-judges the change within to be insufficient to warrant removal of the restric-
tive covenants. At 255 N.C. 38, 120 S.E.2d 827, in denying consideration of
the outside changes the court quotes from the Brenizer case: "It is generally
held that the encroachment of business and changes due thereto, in order to
undo the force and vitality of the restrictions, must take place within the
covenanted area." Brenizer v. Stephens, 220 N.C. 395, 399, 17 S.E.2d 471,
473 (1941).5 Wolff v. Fallon, 269 P.2d 630 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954), aff'd, 44
Cal. 2d 695, 284 P.2d 802 (1955); Downs v. Kroger, 200 Cal. 743, 254 Pac.
1101 (1927) ; Clark v. Vaughan, 131 Kan. 438, 292 Pac. 783 (1930) ; Cushing
v. Lilly, 315 Mich. 307, 24 N.W.2d 94 (1946).
"o Continental Oil Co. v. Fennemore, 38 Ariz. 277, 299 Pac. 132 (1931);
Boston-Edison Protective Ass'n v. Goodlove, 248 Mich. 625, 227 N.W. 772
(1929); Rombauer v. Compton Heights Christian Church 328 Mo. 1, 40
S.W.2d 545 (1931); Martin v. Cantrell, 225 S.C. 140, 81 S.E.2d 37 (1954).
" See, e.g., Fairchild v. Raines, 24 Cal. 2d 818, 151 P.2d 260 (1944);
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The flat pronouncement against piece-meal lifting in the principal
case seems to be North Carolina's first definitive holding on the
point. Although a prior case possibly furnishes some basis for piece-
meal lifting,"8 the decision on this point in Tull is unequivocal.19
Application of this holding in conjunction with the holding against
any consideration of outside changes combine to form a doctrine
which invites analysis in terms of its commercial and social utility.
If these two rules are uniformly and inflexibly applied they pre-
sumably will equally affect small restricted tracts of two or more lots
and large tracts with hundreds of lots. It is obvious that a wholesale
change from residential to commercial use of property surrounding
a two or three lot subdivision should much more readily warrant
releasing all the lots from the restrictions than should a similar
Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Mullen, 200 Md. 487, 90 A.2d 192 (1952); Page v.
Murray, 46 N.J. Eq. 325, 19 Ati. 11 (Ch. 1890).
" The opinions of supreme court cases prior to Tull contains no discus-
sion of this point as far as this writer has been able to ascertain. However,
Oldham v. McPheeters, 203 N.C. 141, 164 S.E. 731 (1932), consists of a
short opinion affirming the lower court's ruling which released from the re-
strictions only the two lots affected. The court did not discuss this particular
result of their affirmation. However, the superior court judge did dwell on
the subject at length.
"It has been seriously suggested that any deviation from the original
scheme must of necessity destroy the whole scheme in the whole development.
This Court can not arrive at such a conclusion. To do so would be to hold
that equity is without power or authority to do exact justice with a nicety.
This Court conceives it has been of the very essence of equity in all of its
past history to venture into new paths if necessary to discover a way to do
exact justice in such fashion that it will work no undue hardship to the other
interested parties related to the situation. It is in an effort to reach such an
end that this Court holds upon the evidence and the findings of fact that a
radical change has been wrought in the area affected by the conditions exist-
ing at and near the intersection of McDowell and Morehead Streets, but
that this change in this particular area does not change the remainder of the
development and does not release the remainder of the development from the
original restrictions in reference to residential purposes." Record, p. 46,
Oldham v. McPheeters, 203 N.C. 141, 164 S.E. 731 (1932), as quoted in Brief
for Plaintiff, p. 14, Tull v. Doctors Building, Inc., 255 N.C. 23, 120 S.E,2d
817 (1961).
9 "It is not necessary for us to approve or disapprove of the judge's
opinion that all of the lots in Block G and Lots 15, 16, and 17 in Block P
should be released from the restrictions requiring residential use, but we do
concur in his opinion as to the law set forth in conclusion of law 5." Tull v.
Doctors Building, Inc., 255 N.C. 23, 41, 120 S.E.2d 817, 829-30. Conclusion
of law 5 reads: "The court is of the opinion that Lots 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 in Block G
and Lots 15, 16, and 17 in Block P, as shown on plaintiffs' Exhibit 1, should
be released from the restrictions requiring residential use; that the court
would adjudge that these lots are so released, except for the court's further
opinion that the law requires either a complete abrogation of the restrictive
covenants on all of the lots in the subdivision, or a complete enforcement of
the restrictive covenants as to all of the lots in the subdivision." Id. at 34-
35, 120 S.E.2d at 825.
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change around a much larger residential area. Furthermore, piece-
meal. lifting has not at all the same practical significance in a small
subdivision that it has in a large one, whatever the basis for in-
validation.
Another factor which militates against an inflexible application
of these two rules arises out of the common practice of developing
large subdivisions in successively platted portions of the whole tract
under identical restrictions. As a practical matter the residents of
one of these subdivisions are apt to consider it a single unit in the
sense of its geography and of their social and economic identity of
interest as residents.20 But the North Carolina court considers that
for related legal purposes each of the successively platted tracts is a
separate unit.21 The question then arises as to whether in application
of the Tull rule against consideration of changes occurring outside
a restricted subdivision, the court will focus on the unified whole or
the separate units as the critical area to determine what is "outside."
If the separate unit concept is applied, an anomalous situation could
result. Abandonment of restrictions in several of these legal units,
actually portions of a unified subdivision, could result in a radical
change in the very heart of the overall residential district similarly
restricted. Yet, the holding in Tull inflexibly applied could deny
relief to a lot immediately adjacent to the completely changed tract
because there had been no change "within the subdivision."
Equity might better be served22 if some flexibility of doctrine in
both regards were maintained to take into account the widely varying
20 See generally 2 AMERIcAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 9.39 (Casner ed. 1952) ;
5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 683-84 (1962); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
§ 871-75 (3d ed. 1939).
21In Higdon v. Jaffa, 231 N.C. 242, 56 S.E.2d 661 (1949), the court
seemingly disposed of this problem with finality in discussing a contention of
the defendant. "They assert initially that the Stephens Company had de-
veloped Myers Park as a unit composed of its different subdivisions . . .
which are merely parts of Myers Park as a whole .... The defendants over-
look the fact that this identical contention has been expressly rejected by this
Court on at least four occasions. McCleskey v. Heinlein, 200 N.C. 290, 156
S.E. 489; Johnson v. Garrett, 190 N.C. 835, 130 S.E. 835; Homes Co. v.
Falls, supra [184 N.C. 426, 115 S.E. 184 (1922)]; Stephens Co. v. Homes
Co., 181 N.C. 335, 107 S.E. 233. The land shown on the map of Blocks I1-C
and 11-D of Myers Park 'is in fact, and was designed to be, a separate, dis-
tinct and integral subdivision,' bearing no relationship whatever in the present
field 6f law to any other subdivision of Myers Park. Stephens Co. v. Homes
Co., supra."
2 See note 18, supra.
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circumstances under which restricted subdivisions are created, and
the widely varying sizes of subdivisions however created.
JAMES M. KImzY
Torts-Libel and Slander-Defenses of Qualtified Privilege and Fair
Comment
The law early recognized the desirability of encouraging free
public discussion and criticism of the official conduct of persons in
public life in order to combat corruption. This was severely ham-
pered, however, by the strictures of the common-law actions of libel
and slander.1 In time, the courts devised a defense to these actions
sometimes labelled qualified or conditional privilege and sometimes
fair comment. Whether these labels carry with them any substan-
tive distinction has been a matter of considerable controversy.
Fair comment embraces within its protection the right to criti-
cize the public conduct of government officers and employees 2 at
every level.' No comment or criticism, however, is fair if it is made
through actual malice.' Neither is it fair comment if it is unreason-
able or made without an honest purpose.' Furthermore, the doc-
1See PROSSER, TORTS 572 (2d ed. 1955). Libel and slander generally are
actions which have not been blessed by agreement or uniformity- of opinion
among those learned in the law. Mr. Justice Black has said: "I have no
doubt myself that the provision, [U.S. CONST. amend. I] as written and
adopted, intended that there should be no libel or defamation law in the
United States . . . just absolutely none so far as I am concerned." Justice
Black & First Amendment Absolutes: A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L. RnV.
549, 557 (1962). Compare the advocacy of absolute liability for defamation
even, in certain situations, where the statements are in fact true in Riesman,
Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment H., 42 COLUM.
L. REv. 1282 (1942).
2 This comment is limited in scope to a discussion of the doctrine of fair
comment as it relates to public officers and candidates. Other areas in which
it has been applied are: works of art and literature, Triggs v. Sun Printing
& Publishing Ass'n, 179 N.Y. 144, 71 N.E. 739 (1904) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 609 (1938) ; the commodities, wares and merchandise of those who appeal
to the public to buy, Schwarz Bros. Co. v. Evening News Publishing Co., 84
N.J.L. 486, 87 At. 148 (Sup. Ct. 1913) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 610 (1938) ;
and those in charge of educational, religious and charitable institutions and
other organizations in which the public has a substantial interest, Klos v.
Zahorik, 113 Iowa 161, 84 N.W. 1046 (1901); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 610
(1938). See generally 1 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 420 (1956).
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 607 (1938).
'Brinsfield v. Howeth, 107 Md. 278, 68 At. 566 (1908).
'Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d
440 (1955); England v. Daily Gazette Co., 143 W.Va. 700, 104 S.E.2d 306
(1958).
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trine of fair comment affords no protection for attacks on one's
private life 'or character." Underlying the doctrine is the policy of
encouraging government to be more responsive to the electorate by
permitting individuals to expose its abuses.'
A defamatory statement is qualifiedly or conditionally privileged
when made on a privileged occasion,8 or pursuant to a political,
judicial, social, or personal duty.' The communication must be
made in good faith' ° and with reasonable grounds to believe in its
truth. 1  The privilege is destroyed on a showing of either malice'
or excessive publication.
13
The authorities are in conflict as to whether fair comment is
simply an application of the doctrine of qualified privilege or a sepa-
rate and distinct defense. A minority of courts make the distinction
that qualified privilege is a defense which excuses or justifies defa-
' Edmonds v. Delta Democrat Publishing Co., 230 Miss. 583, 93 So. 2d 171
(1957).
',Carr v. Hood, 1 Camp N.P. 355 (K.P. 1808) ; See generally Noel, Defa-
ination of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 CoLUm. L. Rnv. 875 (1949).
The doctrine has also been held to be based on the constitutional guarantee
of freedom of speech, Cherry v. Des Moines Leader, 114 Iowa 298, 86
N.W. 323 (1901).
$The occasion is privileged when the publisher of the defamation and
the person receiving it have correlative interests or duties. In Hartsfield v.
Harvey C. Hines Co., 200 N.C. 356, 361, 157 S.E. 16, 19 (1931) it was said,
"Qualified privilege rests upon the fact of interest or duty. That is to say,
if the speaker of the alleged slanderous words has an interest or duty in the
subject matter of the conversation, and the hearer has an interest or duty with
respect to the subject matter of the conversation, then the doctrine of quali-
fied privilege applies." In the recent case of Ponder v. Cobb, 257 N.C. 281,
295, 126 S.E.2d 67, 78 (1962), the court adopted the definition that a privi-
leged occasion is one "when for the public good and in the interests of society
one is freed from liability that would otherwise be imposed on him by reason
of the publication of defamatory matter; one on which a privileged person is
entitled to do something which no one not within the privilege is entitled to do
on that occasion; and it has been said that it is not the publication itself, but
the occasion of its publication, that is privileged." 53 C.J.S., Libel and
Slander § 87 (1948).
'Alexander v. Vann, 180 N.C. 187, 104 S.E. 360 (1920).
"Alexander v. Vann, supra note 9; Gattis v. Kilgo, 128 N.C. 402, 38
S.E. 931 (1901). See generally 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander § 87 (1948).
" Alexander v. Vann, 180 N.C. 187, 104 S.E. 360 (1920).2 The term malice, as it relates to defamation, has been defined as "not
necessarily ... personal ill will or malevolence; it may be said to exist when
it is shown that the publication is made from some ulterior motive and it may
be inferred where a defamatory statement is knowingly false or made without
any fair or reasonable grounds to believe in its truth, or, at times, from the
character and circumstances of the publication itself, but with the exception,
probably, that a man's general moral character is presumed to be good until
the contrary is shown." State v. Greenville Publishing Co., 179 N.C. 720,
723, 102 S.E. 318, 319 (1920).
" Fields v. Bynum, 156 N.C. 413, 72 S.E. 449 (1911).
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mation, while fair comment is simply not defamation because only
the plaintiff's work, and-not the plaintiff himself, has been assailed. 4
But because a showing of malice defeats either defense, 5 the weight of
authority views fair comment only as a special application of the
general doctrine of qualified privilege.' 6
In jurisdictions which view fair comment and qualified privilege
as separate defenses, a distinction can be drawn as to their scope. In
these jurisdictions fair comment is available to all members of the
public.' Qualified privilege, on the other hand, is confined to situa-
tions in which the parties share an interest or duty with respect to
the subject matter of the alleged defamation.' A hypothetical case
may clarify the distinction. A shopkeeper (or anyone else) could,
with impunity, make derogatory statements concerning the mayor's
handling of municipal affairs, protected by his right of fair comment.
However, liability would attach where the criticism was directed to
the mayor's private life, if it had no bearing on his ability or compe-
tence as the city's chief executive. Similarly, the shopkeeper could
tell his partner that a certain employee was stealing from them, and
the communication would be qualifiedly privileged due to the exist-
ence'of a common interest in protecting their business. But the
result would be otherwise if the same statement were made at a social
gathering either to, or by, persons having no legitimate interest or
duty in the matter.
More importantly, there may be a procedural difference in the
two defenses. As a general rule, where the defendant contends that
his statements were protected by a qualified privilege, the plaintiff
has the burden of proving both express malice and falsity in order
to defeat the privilege,' 9 and some courts apply the same rule where
1' Parsons v. Age-Herald Publishing Co., 181 Ala. 439, 61 So. 345 (1913);
Ott v. Murphy, 160 Iowa 730, 141 N.W. 463 (1913) ; Bearce v. Bass, 88 Me.
521, 34 Atl. 411 (1896) ; Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154 Mass. 238,
28 N.E. 1 (1891) ; Van Lonkhuyzen v. Daily News Co., 203 Mich. 570, 170
N.W. 93 (1918); Cook v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 241 Mo. 326, 145 S.W.
480 (1912); Merrey v. Guardian Publishing Co., 79 N.J.L. 632, 80 At. 331(Sup. Ct. 1909) ; Bingham v. Gaynor, 203 N.Y. 27, 96 N.E. 84 (1911) ; Wil-
liams Printing Co. v. Saunders, 113 Va. 156, 73 S.E. 472 (1912).
" Tawney v. Simonson, 109 Minn. 341, 124 N.W. 229 (1909) ; 1 HARPE
& JAmES, THE LAw OF ToRTs 420 (1956).
1. REsTATEMENT, ToRTs § 606 (1938) ; Noel, supra note 7; Note, 45 VA.
L. REv. 772 (1959).
"'Madison v. Bolton, 234 La. 997, 1026, 102 So. 2d 433, 443 (1958);
Kinsley v. Herald & Globe Ass'n, 113 Vt. 272, 277, 34 A.2d 99, 102 (1943).
10 See note 8, supra.
10 Lewis v. Carr, 178 N.C. 578, 101 S.E. 97 (1919).
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the defense of fair comment is interposed. 2' But it has been held
that the right of fair comment can be defeated on a showing of either
express malice or falsity.21
To complete the picture one writer has taken the position that it
is of no consequence which view is accepted, since "there is immunity
on either basis."122
North Carolina is in accord with the majority view that fair
comment is simply one application of the doctrine of qualified privi-
lege and not a distinct defense.2" In the recent case of Ponder v.
Cobb24 the court held that there is a qualified privilege to write
defamatory25 letters to the Governor and the State Board of Elec-
tions concerning the conduct of local election officials in a state-wide
bond referendum. The trial court charged the jury that while the
defendant did have a qualified privilege to lodge his complaint with
the Governor and the State Board of Elections, there was no privi-
lege to make the defamatory statements to persons having no
authority to afford redress. Therefore, release of these letters to the
press was not privileged. On appeal, the supreme court granted a
new trial for error in this instruction, holding that the privilege was
not destroyed by releasing the letters to newspapers of both general
and local circulation. Manifestly, these facts present a case which
would, in the minority view, give rise to the defense of fair com-
ment. But our court, following a long line of past decisions,2"
phrased the decision in terms of qualified privilege.
"
0Pfeiffer v. Haines, 320 Mich. 263, 30 N.W.2d 862 (1948) ; Clancy v.
Daily News Corp., 202 Minn. 1, 277 N.W. 264 (1938).
" Warren v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 336 Mo. 184, 78 S.W.2d 404 (1934).
In the English practice, the plaintiff may successfully attack qualified privi-
lege by showing express malice, but where the defense of fair comment is
raised, the defendant must give negative malice by proving that the comment
was fair. Turner v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Ltd., [1950] 1 All E. R.
449, 461 (H.L.); Adams v. Sunday Pictorial Newspapers, Ltd., [1920] 1
K.B. 354, 359; See generally 24 HALSnURY's LAWS OF ENGLAND, Libel &
Slander § 131 (3d ed. 1958).
' PRossER, TORTS 619 (2d ed. 1955).
" While no case has been discovered expressly repudiating the latter view,
in Yancey v. Gillespie, 242 N.C. 227, 229, 87 S.E.2d 210, 212 (1955), the
court set out the classic definition, couched in terms of qualified privilege:
"Everyone has a right to comment on matters of public interest and concern,
provided he does so fairly and with an honest purpose. Such comments are
not libellous, however severe in their terms, unless they are written mali-
ciously."
-'257 N.C. 281, 126 S.E.2d 67 (1962).
" Qualified privilege is a defense by which defamation is excused or justi-
fied, and not an assertion that the publication was non-defamatory. Yancey
v. Gillespie, 242 N.C. 227, 87 S.E.2d 210 (1955).
"' In North Carolina, qualified privilege has been found in these situations:
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There is a further divergence of judicial opinion on whether
qualified privilege is available where the defamation of a public offi-
cial involves a misstatement of fact. According to the majority the
privilege is limited to comment, criticism, and opinion, and does not
protect a false assertion of fact." There is a growing minority view,
however, that a misstatement of fact may nonetheless be privileged
where the defendant, on reasonable grounds, and after diligent in-
quiry to determine the truth, makes the statement in good faith.2
North Carolina followed the minority position in Lewis v. Carr,29
a newspaper article accusing the chairman of the county board of elections
of using county funds to pay his expenses to the State Teacher's Assembly,
based on false affidavits of two bank employees stating that they had drawn
the vouchers for the plaintiff, Lewis v. Carr, 178 N.C. 413, 72 S.E. 449
(1911); an editorial accusing the plaintiff of being unfaithful and criminally
negligent in the execution of his duties as sheriff, State v. Greenville Pub-
lishing Co., 179 N.C. 720, 102 S.E. 318 (1920); a newspaper report that a
mayor had wasted municipal funds in purchasing a tract of land, Yancey v.
Gillespie, 242 N.C. 227, 87 S.E.2d 210 (1955); a letter to the Superintendent
of the Census alleging that the plaintiff, one of the appointed enumerators,
had murdered two soldiers, and had defrauded the defendant out of his elec-
tion to state office, Ramsey v. Cheek, 109 N.C. 270, 13 S.E. 775 (1891).
For application of the doctrine of qualified privilege generally, see Gattis v.
Kilgo, 128 N.C. 402, 38 S.E. 931 (1901) ; Hartsfield v. Harvey C. Hines Co.,
200 N.C. 356, 157 S.E. 16 (1931) ; and Riley v. Stone, 174 N.C. 588, 94 S.E.
434 (1917).
On the other hand, the court has held the following not to be privileged:
a letter written to the Sheriff of Pitt County concerning the conduct of the
plaintiff, a Deputy Sheriff of Hertford County, Alexander v. Vann, 180 N.C.
187, 104 S.E. 360 (1920) ; a post card sent by the superintendent of public
instruction of Yadkin County to the corresponding official in Davie County
accusing the Treasurer of Davie County of embezzlement, Logan v. Hodges,
146 N.C. 38, 59 S.E. 349 (1907) ; and a postmaster's defense of his adminis-
tration, where malice was shown, Newberry v. Willis, 195 N.C. 302, 142 S.E.
10 (1928). For other cases holding that there was no qualified privilege see
Elmore v. Atlantic C.R.R., 189 N.C. 658, 127 S.E. 710 (1925); and Scott v.
Harrison, 215 N.C. 427, 2 S.E.2d 1 (1939).
"' The jurisdictions which take this view are Alabama, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Okla-
homa, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia,
Washington, and Wisconsin. Annot., 150 A.L.R. 358 (1944).
"8 Coleman v. McLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908) is the leading
case. There, Justice Burch, in a rhetorical moment, set out the rationale for
the minority view when he said, "The people have good authority for believing
that grapes do not grow on thorns nor figs on thistles." Id. at 739, 98 Pac.
at 291. Accord, Snively v. Record Publishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 Pac. 1
(1921); Salinger v. Cowles, 195 Iowa 873, 191 N.W. 167 (1923); Cline v.
Wallace, 144 Kan. 730, 62 P.2d 907 (1936); Clancy v. Daily News Corp.,
202 Minn. 1, 277 N.W. 264 (1938); Lafferty v. Houlihan, 81 N.H. 67, 121
Atl. 92 (1923); Lewis v. Carr, 178 N.C. 578, 101 S.E. 97 (1919); Bailey v.
Charleston Mail Ass'n, 126 W. Va. 292, 27 S.E.2d 837 (1943). See gen-
erally PRossER, TORTS 622 (2d ed. 1955) ; Note, 23 GA. B.J. 421 (1960).
" 178 N.C. 578, 101 S.E. 97 (1919).
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holding that "In cases of qualified privilege ... proof of falsity does
not per se raise a presumption of malice..." and thereby defeat the
privilege."0
In rejecting any distinction between the defenses of qualified privi-
lege and fair comment the North Carolina Supreme Court has
adopted a rule of law which, at very least, has the virtue of sim-
plicity, facilitating understanding and application by the bar and
the courts. By extending the defense of qualified privilege to pro-
tect misstatements of fact, under certain circumstances, the forth-
right citizen is encouraged, and the litigious plaintiff is hopefully
dissuaded. When reviewed in light of the current trend "not to
give the language of privileged communications too strict a scru-
tiny,131 this area of the law would seem to be in a state which should
be applauded.
ROBERT G. BAYNES
" In the most recent case, Ponder v. Cobb, 257 N.C. 281, 126 S.E.2d 67
(1962), both Lewis v. Carr, supra note 29, and Coleman v. McLennan, 78
Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908), are cited and approved. See note 28, supra.
" Gattis v. Kilgo, 128 N.C. 402, 412, 38 S.E. 931, 935 (1901).
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